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“Polylateralism” and New Modes
of Global Dialogue

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“... if only the theory of statecraft and diplomacy had kept pace with the times”.¹

An emerging conventional wisdom is that diplomacy can no longer be considered only in terms of relations between states, but must now take account of wider relationships and modes of dialogue, involving increasingly significant entities such as regional and international organisations, multinational corporations, special economic zones, local and city government, advocacy networks, and influential individuals. The rise of transnational actors and forces in the conduct of international affairs, and the putative erosion of state sovereignty, has been a central theme in a number of post-Cold War writings.² However, many of these writings have tended to overlook the implications of these trends for the practice of diplomacy.³ Moreover, the International Relations discipline has generally neglected the vital link between diplomacy and theory.⁴ This neglect is partly due to the discipline’s emphasis on the structural characteristics of the international system, rather than on diplomatic agency, roles, and relationships. It is also partly due to the professional diplomat’s predilection for secrecy and for placing one’s views on the public record *ex post facto*, invariably in the memoir form. Undoubtedly, these biases impair our thinking about the changing nature of diplomacy and its likely future impact on global politics.

In response to these shortcomings, this paper advances some preliminary observations about evolving patterns of diplomatic interactions between governments and non-state actors, and how we might conceptualise these patterns. To date, most scholarly and journalistic attention appears to have focused on the issue of the rising influence of non-state actors on the international stage.⁵ By contrast, there is comparatively less interest in the other side of the equation: how governments are, or should be, responding to “non-state diplomacy”.⁶ Analytically, one way of addressing this issue is to

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consider if states are in fact resisting, co-opting, or co-operating with non-state actors. Another way is to examine the general predisposition for state diplomatic innovation. Normatively, a central question is whether innovation is required, because — in the context of a globalization trend that is giving rise to emerging actors, issues, sovereignties, and identities — diplomats will need to adapt their role as cautious gate-keepers of a narrowly-defined “national interest” to incorporate a self-perception as innovative change-agents, operating at multiple levels of international discourse and being conscious of “global interests”.⁷

A goal of this paper is to explore whether a new concept of diplomacy, called “polylateralism,” helps us better understand the nature and extent of, and possible responses to, globalization challenges to diplomacy. Hence, this paper considers the idea that traditional, state-centred “bilateral” and “multilateral” diplomatic concepts and practices need to be complemented with explicit awareness of a further layer of diplomatic interaction and relationships. Accordingly, the diplomat of the future will need to operate at the bilateral level (the conduct of relations between two states, usually via resident missions); the multilateral level (diplomacy between three or more states, at permanent or ad hoc international conferences); and, increasingly, the “polylateral” level (relations between states and other entities).

In order to illustrate the idea, it is tempting to make a metaphorical case that three major U.S. cities represent the three types of diplomacy being explicated: Washington DC is the site of a large number of bilateral embassies; New York, as the home of the UN, represents multilateralism; and Los Angeles’ loose system of consulates, local and city government, international corporations, and networks suggests many elements of poly-lateral diplomacy. However, such metaphors invite immediate objection. For example, both New York and Los Angeles host a significant number of consulates which deal with bilateral trade promotion and other consular tasks. Moreover, Washington DC is headquarters not only for an extensive number of major international organisations, notably the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), but also for a plethora of institutes, think tanks, lobby groups, and networks all linked to government policy-makers and diplomats.⁸ Despite these objections, the “cities” metaphor conveys the general idea of different forms of diplomacy.

In terms of International Relations theory, one could loosely situate bilateral diplomacy in the Hobbesian/Realist/system-maintaining tradition, multilateral diplomacy in the Grotian/International Society/system-reforming perspective, and polylateralism in the Kantian/Radical/system-transforming paradigm. In this classification, there are different forms of diplomacy, their essential characteristics can be distinguished (even if not always easily), and they operate conterminously.⁹

Yet another approach to classification is to situate diplomacy as a whole between the realist and radical perspectives, privileging the Grotian or international society tradition developed by Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and the English School. In this tradition, states construct and conduct relations on the

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basis of common norms, rules, and institutions. Implicit in the international society concept (and more explicit in contemporary, reconstituted versions of it) is the idea that the state can play a “positive role” in world affairs and that progressive reform of both state and system is possible. For realist critics of this view, my attempt to differentiate three distinctive forms of diplomacy — bilateralism, multilateralism, and polyilateralism — might be seen as misguided liberal internationalism. For radical critics, it might be seen as yet another apologia for the inherent inability of the state’s diplomatic apparatus to transcend selfish, narrowly-constituted national interests. In short, my underlying theoretical interest is to understand the extent to which the diplomatic institutions of international society are prepared to co-operate with transnational civil society in the search for global peace.¹⁰

Against this background, this paper addresses three interrelated questions:

- (1) In a “globalizing” international system, to what extent is it necessary to go beyond traditional state-dominated concepts of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and to develop a third conceptual layer, termed “polyilateral diplomacy”, in which non-state entities are more closely incorporated into the global dialogue?
- (2) Are state diplomatic actors and institutions capable of operationalising the polyilateral concept, adapting their traditional *modus operandi* so as to include non-state actors at the negotiating table and in other tasks normally reserved for diplomatic agents?
- (3) Will this expanding global dialogue be restricted to small and middle power diplomacy, to a few democracies, to “low policy”, and to uncontroversial, long-term issues?

Re-Defining or Reinventing Diplomacy?

Standard definitions of “diplomacy” tend to be based on three key ideas: namely, the conduct of peaceful relations between mutually-recognised sovereign states, based on expectations of long-term relationships. Historically, diplomacy primarily involves such agents as ambassadors and envoys. In addition, diplomacy also refers to a particular way of doing business. For Satow, it implied the application of intelligence and tact in the conduct of inter-state relations. For Nicolson, diplomacy required virtues such as truthfulness, precision, calm, good temper, patience, modesty, and loyalty.¹¹ More contemporary definitions of diplomacy have veered away from its stylistic preferences and also from its state-centred assumptions. For example, Bull concedes that the conduct of official relations includes states and “other entities with standing in world politics”.¹² Similarly, Barston sees diplomacy as being “concerned with the management of relations between states and other actors”.¹³ In this paper, diplomacy implies more than bilateral relations between sovereign states and multilateral

relations between members of international organisations (IOs). It involves interactions between states, IOs and non-state actors. However, diplomacy is not used here to describe interactions between non-state actors.¹⁴

Beyond general definitions, there is broad agreement on what is meant more particularly by "bilateral" and "multilateral" diplomacy.¹⁵ However, there is less agreement on their significance or effectiveness. In particular, a debate still rages about whether multilateralism actually contributes to co-operation in an anarchical international system, a debate that in some ways seems oblivious to more complex, emerging patterns of global interaction.¹⁶ Therefore, part of the challenge now for diplomacy is to move beyond multilateralism, even before the debate about its role is settled and before we have mastered the requisite skills to implement it.¹⁷

Historical Trends

What does the history of diplomacy suggest in terms of possible long-term trends?¹⁸ Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the diplomatic dialogue was largely characterised by bilateral diplomacy.¹⁹ In this century, the bilateral method has been both complemented and threatened by multilateralism. For example, the post-World War One debate about the shift from "old" to "new" diplomacy was in some sense a debate about the Wilsonian claim that multilateral diplomacy was more effective than the bilateral form, the latter's excesses being widely linked to the outbreak of war in 1914. Hence, "old" or "classical" diplomacy was based largely on the bilateral concept of mutual recognition between two states with relations being conducted largely by embassies, staffed by trained, professional diplomats resident in respective capitals. A basic operating principle was that communications and negotiation should be continuous and confidential.²⁰

In contrast, the main Wilsonian themes in Paris were open and democratic diplomacy, which included ratification of negotiated agreements and multilateral diplomacy under the League of Nations. Wilson's view of open diplomacy was set out in Point One of his Fourteen Points. It argued famously for "Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private [i.e., secret] international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view". In fact, Wilson was not suggesting that the broad public actually be involved in, or even observe, diplomatic negotiations. Rather, his view was that treaties should involve no secret deals and be made available to the public after they had been negotiated by the diplomats. Still, even under this restrictive interpretation of public involvement, Wilson challenged the precepts of old diplomacy.²¹

In even more spectacular fashion than Wilson in Paris, the Russian Revolution represented a greater challenge to the bilateral assumption of the old diplomacy. First, under Trotsky, who amongst other things published all secret treaties and threatened to shut down the foreign ministry,

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and then under the Tsarist diplomat, Georgii Chicherin, the USSR was the first country whose foreign office put new diplomacy into effect.²² The Soviet view of new diplomacy differed from the American in key respects, especially in its perverse interpretation of the idea of democratic participation in diplomacy. Even more dramatic was the idea that the state itself was simply a capitalist construct: in the Bolshevik view, as the state withered, by definition so too would bilateral diplomacy.²³

Thus, inter-war diplomatic practice stimulated by the Great War, the Russian Revolution, and Wilson, introduced, but by no means fully implemented, several key innovative ideas. These were that diplomacy would be less European than hitherto; less dominated by the colonial powers; more multilateral than under the nineteenth century Concert System; more hospitable to smaller powers; more open to public scrutiny; less managed by powerful foreign ministries; less aristocratic and elitist in recruitment, training, and organisational values; and more influenced than ever by economic ministries and speedier communications.

The post-Second World War, or Cold War, system had several contradictory effects on the evolution of diplomatic practice. While the UN system was an advance on the League in terms of encouraging a deeper and wider trend towards multilateralism as the dominant form of diplomacy, Cold War rivalry generally put serious breaks on this trend. Paradoxically, the Cold War diplomatic system reinforced the idea of bilateralism in the sense that the most important relationship was two-sided: the cities that counted were Moscow and Washington DC, not New York and Geneva. Moreover, the intense ideological and nuclear rivalry between the superpowers had the effect of reinforcing the need for secrecy in diplomacy, not only in Moscow and Washington, but also throughout their respective alliances. In the U.S., “dissent” (not “innovation”) became a term of reference for non-conformist policy thought, from the so-called loss of China in 1949 through to the Vietnam War. Hence, in important respects, diplomacy regressed in a Cold War nuclear threat-based order, which involved even more “reflexive secrecy” than the old diplomacy.²⁴ In the process, non-state actors were kept at a distance from diplomatic activity, notably in the security field.

However, while the Cold War gave rise to a secretive, superpower, bipolar system (a kind of bilateralism), diplomatic practice adapted in other respects. In particular, decolonisation and superpower bipolarity stimulated many, innovative multilateral responses, such as with the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the formation of voting blocs in the UN General Assembly.²⁵ Perhaps even more impressively, and enduringly, for the development of diplomatic practice was the evolution of the European Union (EU) and its instruments of diplomacy.²⁶ Further, by the 1970s and 80s, many Western foreign services had adopted more meritocratic and diverse recruitment practices, going a long way in breaking the nineteenth century elitist model.²⁷ Finally, with the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, multilateralism (for a time) and regionalism flourished.²⁸

Changes associated with globalisation trends in the post-Cold War diplomatic system re-opened the debate about the nature and future of

diplomacy. Four factors are especially significant in understanding these trends: (1) the rise of non-state actors, (2) a deregulating international environment, (3) a shift from inter-state to internal forms of conflict, and (4) the impact of new information and communication technologies. Consequently, an emerging consensus is building around the idea that fundamentally new forms of global dialogue are taking shape as a result of these trends, leaving traditional bilateral and even state-based multilateral diplomacy less relevant. Writers have advanced new concepts, emphasising the rise of new actors and issues outside the convenient rubrics of bilateralism and multilateralism. Some of these concepts, such as "transnationalism", attract wide support, and generally succeed in transmitting the idea of new cross-border actors and issues. However, this concept also implies an ever-expanding range of non-state activities which progressively erode state sovereignty and influence. In some versions, transnationalism portends post-Westphalian forms of governance.²⁹

Other concepts have been devised in order to capture shifts in the global dialogue. Some of these concepts include: "triangular diplomacy" (state-state, state-firm, firm-firm relations); "multilayered diplomacy" (involving noncentral governments); "second track diplomacy" (methods of diplomacy outside the formal governmental system, often initiated by non-governmental actors and involving diplomats in their personal capacity); "multitrack diplomacy" (an extension of the second-track concept, which includes a wide range of societal groups engaged in peacemaking activities); "niche diplomacy" (the ability of small and middle powers to provide initiative and leadership in specific international areas); "preventive diplomacy" (action designed to prevent existing disputes from escalating into military conflicts); and "virtual diplomacy" (a process of direct global and transnational communication and bargaining between non-state groups and individuals made possible by new technologies, such as the Internet).³⁰

Each one of these concepts conveys a certain idea and reflects a general sense of the changing nature of diplomacy. The question is whether new forms of diplomatic relations, in which at least one of the participants is a non-state entity, can be incorporated under a single rubric, one that not only helps us to see transformations in the world at large, but also enhances our ability to describe these changes, and even give some guidance about possible responses. To this end, "polylateralism" is offered as a contribution to the conceptual debate. My working definition of this concept is: "the conduct of relations between official entities (such as a state, several states acting together, or a state-based international organisation) and at least one unofficial, non-state entity in which there is a reasonable expectation of systematic relationships, involving some form of reporting, communication, negotiation, and representation, but not involving mutual recognition as sovereign, equivalent entities".

Thus, as already indicated, my interest here is less in the idea of "NGO diplomacy", but more in the idea of how states will relate to non-state entities and their representatives. Clearly, the emerging polylateral layer of

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international relations will require states to make institutional adjustments. As P.J. Simmons argues:

Although many traditional centers of power are fighting a rear-guard action against these new players, there is no real way to keep them out. Instead, the real challenge is figuring out how to incorporate NGOs [non-governmental organizations] into the international system in a way that takes account of their diversity and scope, their various strengths and weaknesses and their capacity to disrupt as well as to create.³¹

In other words, as global patterns of power, alignment, communications, and dialogue acquire more complexity, the evolution of more effective, systematic working relationships with non-state actors will require states to adopt new concepts, skills, instruments and outlooks.

In this context, many recent writings argue, or imply, that the role of the state is in terminal decline.³² Yet, there is evidence — such as the growing number of states in international society and the recovery of faith in new variants of social democracy in Western Europe — that the state remains a resilient and viable political unit and will continue to be a key actor in the foreseeable future.³³ Furthermore, there are hints that the institutions of diplomacy themselves can indeed “keep pace with the times” and reach out to new actors. However, to make this case more plausible, diplomacy will need to do more than hint at accommodation. It will need to display a high degree of institutional and conceptual innovation.

Prospects for Diplomatic Innovation: Constraints and Opportunities

“Innovation” — seen as a capacity for nontrivial change — is an understudied concept in a diplomatic context.³⁴ The relative absence of analytical literature on diplomatic innovation at the foreign service level is further underscored by the extensive scholarly attention devoted to innovation and readiness in the military domain.³⁵ Moreover, the actual extent of diplomatic innovation is widely unacknowledged. Interestingly, former U.S. secretary of state Warren Christopher has linked military force to the idea of “diplomatic readiness”, although this latter concept does not, as yet, appear to have attracted wide scholarly attention.³⁶ Against this background of neglect, five working propositions are offered about the prospects for diplomatic innovation, in general, and about the implications for polyilateralism, in particular. These propositions are that:

1. State capacity for diplomatic innovation is generally underestimated.
2. Small and middle-sized state diplomatic institutions are more likely to innovate and co-operate with non-state actors.

3. Democracies are more likely to innovate polylaterally than semi-democracies and non-democracies.
4. Foreign ministries and diplomatic services are more likely to display innovative, polylateral tendencies with non-state actors in "low politics" issues, and less likely to do so when it comes to security-oriented "high politics".
5. State foreign and diplomatic establishments are more likely to co-operate with non-state actors engaged in long-term policy influence, and less likely with those engaged in short-term political campaigns or protests.

1. State Capacity for Diplomatic Innovation is Generally Underestimated

Diplomatic culture is widely believed to be conservative and resistant to innovation and entrepreneurial leadership. Indeed, there are good grounds for such a belief. Widely seen as compliant Weberian "civil servants" in many countries, diplomats are expected to carry out the orders of their political masters, rather than show policy initiative. In a Realist vein, Henry Kissinger claims that the actual range of diplomatic innovation is heavily "circumscribed by history, domestic institutions, and geography".³⁷ Similarly, as Arthur Schlesinger argues, "[t]he primary function of statecraft is preservation, not innovation".³⁸ Reinforcing the expectation that innovation will be provided by political leaders and not professional diplomats, scholars and journalists tend to focus on "high" or "ministerial" diplomacy — the activities of presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, and other high-profile public figures and officials involved in statecraft. Accordingly, it is relatively easy to find examples of initiative or innovation by "statesmen" performing acts of "high diplomacy". Recent examples include Johan Jørgen Holst, the Norwegian foreign minister who brokered the agreement between Israel and the PLO, and Richard Holbrooke who negotiated the Dayton peace agreement on Bosnia.

In contrast, it is less easy to identify from the literature cases of innovation and leadership in "ambassadorial diplomacy" or "professional diplomacy". As argued above, many observers tend to be sceptical that innovation can be initiated at this level.³⁹ This scepticism and neglect is exacerbated by a long-standing, but not always well-informed, view that the ambassador is of declining importance.⁴⁰ In fact, what is often meant is that traditional, bilateral diplomacy is of declining importance in the overall conduct of global relations, or is being supplanted by multilateral diplomacy (rather than the declining importance of diplomatic dialogue or relations *per se*).

This "declinist" view is partly explained by the reluctance of scholars, journalists and others to try to understand diplomatic functions, and partly by the reticence of diplomats to explain what they do between cocktail parties (at least, as mentioned earlier, until they write their memoirs in retirement).⁴¹ In this view, since "career" diplomats are mere civil servants faithfully carrying out the policies of political leaders, there is really no need for diplomatic innovation within foreign service establishments. Hence, the

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major requirement for international peace and security is to have the right kind of political leaders doing “high diplomacy”, backed up by dutiful, diplomatic support staff. In other words, allowing for power differentials, all foreign services are more or less the same, requiring basic, non-innovative skills and capacities. This assumption that leadership and innovation will be provided by politically-appointed “non-career” officials and ambassadors is especially strong in the U.S. For example, Stearns argues that American foreign policy has become “the responsibility of political rather than diplomatic advisers”.⁴² Many of these assumptions are reflected within the American International Relations discipline, as evidenced by the dominance of Foreign Policy Analysis over Diplomatic Studies.⁴³

Contrary to the conventional assumption that the sources and opportunities for innovative diplomacy are highly circumscribed, there are, in fact, abundant examples of such innovation. As argued above in my brief historical survey, crises and periods of historical transition, such as the end of wars, including the Cold War, create conditions and incentives for innovation.⁴⁴ For instance, innovative “supranational” diplomats, such as Jean Monnet in the early post-war years and Jacques Delors in the 1980s, recognise such opportunities and exploit them.⁴⁵ This opportunism has been evident occasionally in international organisations, such as the UN, long-criticised for bureaucratic inertia. One example of intellectual leadership and conceptual innovation is Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s *Agenda for Peace*, a publication released in the early post-Cold War period, and which reinvigorated a dormant debate about the idea of “preventive diplomacy”.⁴⁶

In addition to individual-level sources of diplomatic innovation at times of historical transition, there are arguably untapped organisational reservoirs within foreign and diplomatic services. Ironically, one organisational source is the diplomatic lifestyle itself. Often misrepresented as a life of privilege and excessive comfort, many diplomats show remarkable adaptability in foreign environments. Moreover, diplomats are required to show extraordinary international mobility for themselves and their families. Clearly, adaptability and mobility are characteristics suggestive of a predisposition towards innovation.

A further, possible source of innovation (or at least a lack of constraint on innovation) concerns the poorly-understood relationship between foreign ministries and domestic politics. The point is often made that foreign ministries are weak in policy-making terms, because they lack domestic support bases, or constituencies. Indeed, this is often the case. However, a more subtle point in need of exploration is that foreign ministries are in many ways less beholden to domestic pressure groups that are themselves resistant to change, because these groups are simply protecting narrow interests. Paradoxically, on this score, foreign ministries are in some ways less constrained than other ministries and may therefore be more capable of displaying policy innovation in international problem-solving.⁴⁷ Moreover, if diplomats can play “two-level games”, then it seems conceivable that they can also play “multi-level games” and, as discussed below, in some cases

they are doing so already. On this argument, therefore, foreign ministries are at least theoretically capable of learning and developing relationships with non-traditional actors.⁴⁸

In addition to these general arguments, one can point to specific examples which offer some support for this cautiously optimistic view of diplomatic organisational innovation. In Canada and Australia, foreign ministries underwent serious experiments with reorganisation, involving trade departments being amalgamated with traditional foreign ministries.⁴⁹ While these reorganisations were driven by political leaders, there is evidence that "diplomatic perestroika" was readily accepted by adaptive diplomats. In addition, this restructuring had the effect of diluting a precious foreign ministry mentality and encouraging a more extroverted, entrepreneurial trade promoting diplomat, an effect that amounted to more than "narcissistic innovations".⁵⁰ Moreover, there are cases of specific organisational innovation involving foreign ministry relations with publics and non-state actors. Langhorne cites the example of Brazil's mobile consulate in Paraguay and Japan's institutional adjustments for co-operating with NGOs. Other examples, which hint that diplomats may in some circumstances be able to see beyond the "national interest" black box, include ideas for joint representation and shared embassies.⁵¹ On these arguments, it is not necessarily the case that diplomats will routinely resist innovation and change.

There are some grounds for arguing, then, that innovative and change-oriented foreign service institutions, working effectively with political leaders or senior "entrepreneurial" diplomats, can overcome a risk-aversion mind-set. Moreover, diplomatic institutions can "learn" how to construct a broader, more inclusive, less state-centric basis for innovative conflict management and problem-solving based at least in part on global, as well as national, interests. In short, there is a plausible case that change-oriented "norm entrepreneurs" operate more widely than expected in diplomatic bureaucracies.⁵²

2. Small and Middle-Sized State Diplomatic Institutions are More Likely to Innovate and Co-Operate with Non-State Actors

To what extent does a foreign ministry's predisposition to innovate derive from state-size, and are innovation-inclined ministries more likely to develop co-operative, systematic relations with non-state actors? Intuitively, it could be argued that great (especially super) power foreign ministries will tend to see less need to innovate, in general, and less need to involve non-state actors, in particular. In this view, great powers have fewer requirements for outsiders because such states already possess superior material power and resources. Thus, reflecting Machiavelli's admonition that "armed prophets are victorious and the unarmed come to ruin", U.S. policy debates tend to focus on the best ways to use American military and economic power, rather than on overcoming the limits of that power through innovative diplomatic practices which enhance State Department policy leadership and diplomatic skill.

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As one former U.S. career ambassador has argued: “great states, like ocean liners, shift course almost imperceptibly and achieve their destination in an interval of time determined by inertial forces more powerful and fundamental than any controlled by their Foreign Service crews”.⁵³ Hence, this American reliance on “negotiating from strength”, and the related decision-making entitlements of the Pentagon, CIA and economic departments at the expense of the State Department, may well have had the perverse effect of diminishing certain U.S. negotiating and other diplomatic skills.⁵⁴ This might explain *inter alia* why the U.S. appears to do better in bilateral negotiations, and less well in a multilateral setting. Instructively, the U.S. conceptual contribution has tended to be in “coercive” and “crisis diplomacy”.⁵⁵ Moreover, even when a superpower such as the U.S. finds that it has a need for nongovernmental expertise, it will tend to “co-opt” rather than “co-operate”. Simmons’ observation that the U.S. has a “relatively poor” record in collaborating with NGOs in the high politics field of arms control and regional conflict supports this conclusion.⁵⁶

By contrast, small and middle powers are often regarded as a source of international innovation. Recent middle power literature in particular suggests that innovation and learning are more likely to be located in states such as Canada and Australia, deftly promoting “middle power internationalism”, “norm construction,” and “soft power”.⁵⁷ A celebrated, recent example of middle power innovation, highly suggestive of polyilateralism, is the campaign that led to the 1997 Ottawa landmines treaty (the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction).⁵⁸ This case illustrates the nature, dynamics and potential of the “diplomatic” roles and relationships which formed between a middle-sized state (Canada) and a large NGO network (the International Campaign to Ban Landmines). However, many accounts of this campaign focus on the NGO role, overlooking the equally interesting phenomenon of state/non-state co-operation. Indeed, this combined governmental and nongovernmental campaign is widely regarded as being so successful that one participant involved in the Ottawa process suggested that the treaty signalled “a new kind of diplomacy ... a new texture in the international system where negotiating tables have new players and shapes, where linkages and networks transcend state limits, and, even perhaps, where moral sensibilities have a voice”.⁵⁹ The main question arising from this case is whether it is unique or a harbinger of a fundamentally new form of diplomacy in which international society and transnational civil society co-operate. One anticipates the results of scholarly studies on this important case, which will help us understand better the extent to which Canadian diplomats and officials, led by foreign minister Axworthy, re-constructed their institutional mind-set, resources, and priorities in order to galvanise a highly successful government-NGO diplomatic coalition.

While Canada’s innovative leadership on the landmines campaign is the most prominent recent example, its success echoes the country’s pioneering achievements in peacekeeping from the 1950s.⁶⁰ Moreover, there have been

other less conspicuous initiatives, such as the North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue, which had only modest success, but was nonetheless significant for the way it demonstrated an institutional capacity to reach out to networks of domestic and transnational actors.

Until the landmines campaign, Australia was widely seen (and indeed saw itself) as an innovative middle power, and not without reason. One example of Australian international entrepreneurship in the security field was Australia's role in facilitating the Cambodian peace settlement.⁶¹ Another example was Canberra's active involvement in negotiations leading to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).⁶² Yet another high profile example was the Australian government initiative to convene the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, a high-level group comprising many non-governmental representatives, but staffed by Australian government officials.⁶³

Yet again, this begs the question whether middle power internationalism, or the diplomatic variant advanced here as "middle power polylateralism", will be, in Keohane's terms, "system influencing" by helping to develop new norms of diplomatic conduct involving non-state actors. While, for the most part, the great powers will remain "system determining", the new global complexities suggest that these powers are losing their monopoly in global management, including in some areas of international peace and security.⁶⁴ Moreover, even if polylateralism remains a doctrine for small to middle powers only, with limited normative impact on the international system, at the least it can be argued that states which operate at all three levels will be more effective within the system.

3. Democracies are More Likely to Innovate Polylaterally than Semi-Democracies and Non-Democracies?

It seems more than a coincidence that middle (and small) power innovation is typically manifested by quintessential democracies such as Canada, Australia, Norway, and Sweden. Yet, some semi- (or emerging) democracies also stake claims to initiative-taking in international affairs. This category includes such countries as Malaysia, Argentina, Mexico, and Turkey; Singapore could also be added to this list.⁶⁵ While semi-democracies and non-democracies can and do show initiative in international affairs, they are more likely to limit themselves to "track two" diplomacy involving elites closely linked to government, and are less likely to innovate in a polylateral direction. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, innovation will tend to do better in open societies, in large part because of general acceptance of the need for the free flow of ideas and information, which includes societal transparency and a preparedness to learn from mistakes. Secondly, polylateral innovation requires the inclusion of diverse groups from civil society, many of whom will often be critical of government policy. It takes a strong democracy to appreciate the benefits of such an inclusionary approach.

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4. Foreign Ministries and Diplomatic Services are More Likely to Display Innovative, Polyilateral Tendencies with Non-State Actors in “Low Politics” Issues, and Less Likely to do so When It Comes to Security-Oriented “High Politics”.

Most research on NGO influence is drawn from “low politics” cases, such as human rights and the environment.⁶⁶ Indeed, since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic growth in the number of cases of states contracting out humanitarian and developmental service tasks to NGOs. In addition, many international organisations, such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU have also shown a predisposition to reach out to NGOs for technical support and, increasingly, even policy advice.⁶⁷

The question is whether states will open the door to non-state actors interested in providing services and offering policy advice in the realm of high politics. In other words, are foreign ministries more likely to display innovative, polyilateral tendencies with non-state actors in “low politics” issues, and less likely to do so when it comes to security-oriented “high politics”? Under Cold War conditions, as strongly implied above, “high politics polyilateralism” was firmly resisted. However, since the late 1980s, there is some evidence that NGOs are muscling their way into high politics.⁶⁸ The Ottawa landmines treaty, cited above, and institutionalisation of security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region, described below, are good examples.

In regional conflict, an often-quoted successful case is the positive role of the Italian NGO Comunità di Sant’Egidio in Mozambique in helping to bring warring parties together.⁶⁹ However, there are many less successful cases. For example, Simmons cites the problematic role of NGOs in several armed conflicts, such as Chiapas, Bosnia, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Rwanda.⁷⁰ Moreover, while non-state actors may well have an impact on the “soft power” side of regional conflicts (such as preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping or peacebuilding, a point alluded to by Boutros-Ghali in *Agenda for Peace*), it is doubtful that the great powers will easily yield their near-monopoly in heavy-duty, peace enforcement in such places as Kuwait, Bosnia or Kosovo.

5. State Foreign and Diplomatic Establishments are More Likely to Co-Operate with Non-State Actors Engaged in Long-Term Policy Influence, and Less Likely with Those Engaged in Short-Term Political Campaigns or Protests.

Whereas the landmines campaign provides some evidence that diplomats can co-operate with transnational civil society actors in short-term campaigns, the role of the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) in promoting a new norm of regional security dialogue in the 1990s is a useful test as to whether polyilateralism will be more attractive to diplomats when the process involves systematic, long-term relations.

CSCAP was established in June 1993 as a "track two", nongovernmental forum to provide a structured process for multinational security dialogue among countries and territories in the Asia-Pacific region. It links regional security-oriented institutes and, through them, broad-based member committees consisting of academics, security specialists, and former and current foreign ministry and defence officials acting in their private capacities. CSCAP's membership consists of 18 member/associate member committees from the region. One of CSCAP's earliest objectives — to initiate an official-level multilateral dialogue on regional security issues — was achieved in 1994 with the establishment of the governmental ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which brings the region's foreign ministers together for annual meetings. Since then, CSCAP has worked to provide direct support to the ARF. It does this through issue-oriented international working groups on confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), comprehensive and co-operative security, maritime security, North Pacific security co-operation, and transnational crime.⁷¹

The range of activities and networking in the CSCAP forum represents something different from "track two" diplomatic efforts. Indeed, it is highly suggestive of a higher level of diplomatic intercourse in which states are being persuaded and pressured to develop more complex and systematic relationships and instruments for dealing with new actors and processes. The purpose of this example is not only to show how non-state actors are getting into the business of diplomacy, but also to suggest that states are showing varying degrees of responsiveness to these actors. The CSCAP/ARF process implies incipient polyateral relationships.⁷²

Conclusions

This paper implicitly counsels caution to those who claim that the Westphalian sovereign state system, and its associated diplomatic methods, are doomed by globalization. To be sure, the state is yielding key areas of control over the international dialogue as new actors, issues and technologies increasingly make their mark. However, for better or worse, the state is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. During this period, the actual role of the state will be determined in part by its own resiliency in the face of globalization trends. An important test of state resilience will be its capacity to redefine or reinvent diplomatic institutions as the terms of the global dialogue change.

This paper advances five working propositions designed to help us assess the future of diplomacy. It concludes that state capacity for diplomatic adaptation and innovation is generally underestimated and that the extent of innovation will vary with state size, state governance type, issue area, and issue longevity.

On state size, we might expect that great or larger powers will be less likely to innovate and will tend to co-opt, rather than co-operate with, non-state actors, offering only token acceptance of polyateralism. In contrast, we can expect nimble, small and middle-sized states to make the conceptual

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shift more readily, contributing in the process to the construction of new diplomatic norms and practices.

Related to this observation, we can expect that democracies will be more likely than semi-democracies and non-democracies to welcome and utilise non-state actor participation in the emerging global diplomatic dialogue.

As for issue-area, one would expect foreign ministries and diplomatic services to be more amenable to non-state actor engagement in low politics and less hospitable in high politics. However, the Ottawa landmines case suggests that this distinction may be even harder to sustain in future. In time, we will know whether the landmines case is *sui generis*, whether it should be regarded as a low politics/humanitarian issue, or whether it represents the thin edge of a globalizing wedge cutting deep into high politics. As with President Wilson in 1919, diplomats will continue to regard the negotiation of international agreements and outcomes in certain “hard” security areas — war fighting and termination, intelligence exchanges, defence planning and procurement, weapons of mass destruction, peace enforcement — as largely the preserve of state authorities. Yet, there is evidence beyond the landmines case of non-state actors injecting their way into high politics, or at least into some of the “soft” security areas. These areas include peacekeeping support and training, “monitoring” of cease-fires and agreements (as with OSCE monitors in Kosovo), and “facilitating” the resolution of small-scale, or neglected, regional conflicts (as in Mozambique), while not quite acting as fully-fledged negotiating partners. Thus, state responsiveness to non-state actor involvement will vary not only with issue-area, but also with the “decision phase”, whether it be issue-framing (agenda-setting), issue mobilisation, negotiation, or the final implementation and monitoring phase.

The hypothesis that diplomatic establishments are more likely to co-operate with non-state actors engaged in long-term policy influence and less likely with those engaged in short-term political campaigns or protests is also challenged by the landmines case. Indeed, this hypothesis is likely to be tested further in the growing international campaign to control the transfer of light weapons. However, while the likely future diplomatic response to such “short-term” campaigns remains difficult to determine, the early, if limited, success in institutionalising regional security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s suggests that there might be a future for “long-term” polyilateral relationships in the security field.

This likely state preference for dealing with non-state entities on a long-term basis raises the issue of non-state actor “diplomatic style”. The limits of how far such actors can, and should, compromise with the stylistic conventions of traditional diplomacy (such as discretion, compromise, tact) were illustrated by robust remarks made about U.S. policy by the leading landmines campaign spokesman, Jodi Williams, after winning the Nobel Peace Prize.⁷³ In the interests of long-term policy co-operation, transnational advocacy networks may well need to make some compromises as to the nature and tone of their engagement with governments, perhaps smoothing some of the rougher edges of the campaigner. Indeed, there

is evidence that this is already happening.⁷⁴ Diplomats, too, will need to drop some of their affectations.

The polylateralism impulse in the history of diplomacy is still in its infancy. Consequently, we need to devise ways to analyse the interplay between international society and transnational civil society, measuring whether, and if so how, states are adapting and innovating in a polylateral direction. Such measures would include: whether non-state actors and relationships are taken into account by foreign ministries and diplomats in their actual functions, including at embassies abroad; whether practical foreign service organisational reforms are implemented (such as recruitment, training, and exchange and sabbatical leave policies); and whether states increase nonstate actor involvement in international representation (such as participation rates in preparatory committees, national delegations, and negotiations at international conferences).

In conclusion, this paper suggests that diplomacy in the 21st century will be bilateral, multilateral, and polylateral in character. Under globalizing conditions, those states that are capable of conducting all three forms of diplomacy enunciated here are more likely to thrive and to contribute meaningfully to global peace and security. Therefore, the innovative diplomat should not disregard the advantages of focus, intimacy, and special knowledge inherent in a bilateral, state-to-state relationship. Equally, the innovative diplomat should exploit multilateralism, in both its regional and international forms, in order to fill in important co-ordinating and "subsidiarity" gaps. Finally, diplomatic innovators will welcome the benefits implicit in polylateralism, such as wider democratic legitimacy, and access to expertise and new policy ideas widely available in global civil society.

Notes

This paper is a revised draft of a version presented at a panel on "Globalization and the Future of Diplomacy" at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 16–20 February, 1999, Washington DC.

1. William W. Kaufmann, 'Two American Ambassadors: Bullitt and Kennedy,' in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), *The Diplomats, 1919–1939*, (1953), 2 vols, New York: Atheneum, 1965, p. 681.

2. For example, Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: The Free Press, 1992; Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?,' *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no.3 (Summer 1993); and Jessica T. Mathews, 'Power Shift', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no.1 (January/February 1997).

3. Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., *The Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997.

4. Exceptions include International Society writers, such as Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, London: Macmillan, 1977, esp. ch.7; and Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society*, London: Routledge, 1992. For an original "post-modernist" perspective, see James Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. See also Costas M. Constantinou, *On the Way to Diplomacy*, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

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5. The term “non-state actors” is used loosely here to include non-profit organisations, transnational advocacy networks, local government, multinational corporations, and powerful individuals with global interests, such as Bill Gates, Ted Turner and George Soros. Non-state actors do not include state-based international and regional organisations, such as the UN and the EU. On transnational advocacy networks, see Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998. See also P.J. Simmons, ‘Learning to Live with NGOs’, *Foreign Policy*, (Fall 1998). For a journalistic view, see Paul Lewis, ‘Not Just Governments Make War or Peace,’ *The New York Times*, November 28, 1998, p. A19.

6. Recent studies which examine the impact of non-state actors on the theory and practice of diplomacy include Brian Hocking, ‘Catalytic Diplomacy: Beyond ‘Newness’ and ‘Decline’,’ in Jan Melissen (ed.), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, London: Macmillan, 1999; Richard Langhorne, ‘Current Developments in Diplomacy: Who are the Diplomats Now?’, *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, vol. 8, no. 2 (July 1997); and Rik Coolsaet, ‘The Transformation of Diplomacy at the Threshold of the New Millennium,’ DSP Discussion Papers, No.48, Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, 1998.

7. Here, “globalization” is seen as a form of accumulated social change that involves the deepening of political, economic, and cultural relations between peoples across borders. These relationships are promoted by new communications technologies and tend to weaken the moral and organisational authority of the state. On diplomats transcending national interests, see the classic François de Callières, *The Art of Diplomacy* (1716), edited by H.M.A. Keens-Soper and Karl W. Schweizer, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983 Lanham: University Press of America, 1994, p. 70. For a contemporary view, see Sasson Sofer, ‘The Diplomat as a Stranger,’ *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol. 8, no.3 (November 1997), pp. 179, 183.

8. On the idea of “global polyarchy,” see Seyom Brown, *New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics*, New York: HarperCollins, 1995.

9. On the three traditions, see Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School*, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press in association with St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 1998. For an American perspective on three competing “worldviews”, see Steven L. Lamy (ed.), *Contemporary International Issues: Contending Perspectives*, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988.

10. For thoughtful discussion of similar themes, see Andrew Linklater ‘The evolving spheres of international justice,’ esp. pp. 478–9; and Richard Devetak and Richard Higgott, ‘Justice unbound? Globalization, states and the transformation of the social bond’, both articles in *International Affairs*, vol. 75, no.3 (July 1999). On the normative potential of international society, see Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, ‘Hedley Bull’s Pluralism of the Intellect and Solidarism of the Will,’ *International Affairs*, vol.72, no.1 (1996).

11. Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (1939), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 55–67.

12. Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 162.

13. R.P. Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*, 2nd ed., London & New York: Longman, 1997. p.1. For other definitions, see G.R. Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, London: Prentice Hall, 1995, p. 1; and Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*, London: Routledge, 1995, p.1.

14. Robert Wolfe has made this argument in private correspondence and as a discussant in a panel titled ‘Diplomacy and Government-Business Relations in the International Arena’ at the 40th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, 16–20 February, 1999, Washington DC.

15. For a clear explication of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, see Berridge, *Diplomacy*.

16. On this debate, see, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions,’ *International Security*, vol. 19, no.3 (Winter 1994/95); and various responses in *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995). See also John G. Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

17. For a study of the difficulties faced by multilateral diplomacy in dealing with emerging transnational problems, see David T. Twining, *Beyond Multilateralism*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998.

18. Hamilton and Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, provides an excellent survey of the history of diplomacy. Classical historical references include de Callières, *The Art of Diplomacy*; Lord Gore-Booth (ed.), *Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, (1917) London: Longman, 1979; Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1955; Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy*; and Harold Nicolson, (1954) *The Evolution of Diplomacy*, New York: Collier, 1966.

19. Pre-1914 exceptions to this generalisation include the Concert of Europe, and the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences.

20. On the persistence of bilateral diplomacy, see Robert Wolfe, 'Still Lying Abroad? On the Institution of the Resident Ambassador,' *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, vol. 9, no. 2 (July 1998); and Coolsaet, 'The Transformation of Diplomacy,' pp. 20–21.

21. The depth of this challenge is conveyed in Harold Nicolson's negative reaction to the new (or, what he disparagingly called, "American") style of diplomacy. A member of the UK delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, Nicolson later opposed the idea of "itinerant public conferences." See *The Evolution of Diplomacy*, pp. 99–125, esp. p. 103. See also Herbert Butterfield, 'The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy,' in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966; Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, pp. 218–45; and Gaddis Smith, *Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points After 75 Years*, Twelfth Morgenthau Memorial Lecture on Ethics and Foreign Policy, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1993.

22. Theodore H. von Laue, 'Soviet Diplomacy: G.V. Chicherin, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1918–1930', in Craig and Gilbert, *The Diplomats*, p. 241. See also Hamilton and Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, pp. 148–53.

23. On how Soviet diplomacy subsequently became "socialised" into international society, see David Armstrong, *Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

24. This phrase is used by David Brin, letter to the editor, *Foreign Policy*, (Fall 1998), p. 171.

25. Robert O. Keohane, 'Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,' *International Organization*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 1969), p. 291. On multilateralism and the diplomatic specialist, see Hamilton and Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, pp. 202–9.

26. On the EU as a diplomatic actor, see Carolyn Rhodes (ed.), *The European Union in the World Community*, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1998; and David Spence, 'Foreign Ministries in National and European Context', in Brian Hocking (ed.), *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*, London: Macmillan Press, 1999. For a sceptical view, see Philip H. Gordon, 'Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy,' *International Security*, vol. 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/98).

27. Michael Palliser, 'Diplomacy Today,' pp. 382–3, in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. This book argues that Third World states generally adopted the Western diplomatic system, rather than developing their own.

28. On post-Cold War multilateralism, see Ruggie, *Multilateralism Matters*. On post-Cold War regionalism, see Andrew Hurrell, 'Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics', *Review of International Studies*, vol. 21, no. 4 (October 1995).

29. Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-state Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995. On "transgovernmentalism", see Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'The Real New World Order,' *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 5 (September/October 1997). See also Mathews, 'Power Shift'.

30. Susan Strange, 'States, firms and diplomacy,' *International Affairs*, vol. 68, no. 1 (January 1992); Brian Hocking, *Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and*

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Multilayered Diplomacy, London: Macmillan, 1993; Louise Diamond and John McDonald, *Multitrack Diplomacy*, 3rd.ed., West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1996; Andrew F. Cooper (ed.), *Niche Diplomacy*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997; Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996; Kevin M. Cahill (ed.), *Preventive Diplomacy Stopping Wars Before They Start*, New York: Basic Books, 1996; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *The Advent of Netwar*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1996. The US Institute of Peace convened a conference on "virtual diplomacy" in Washington DC in April 1997. The keynote speeches are available on the Institute's web site, www.usip.org. For a sceptical view of the impact of the internet, see George P. Shultz, 'Diplomacy, Wired', *Hoover Digest Selections*, no. 1 (1998), adapted from Shultz's keynote speech delivered at the USIP conference.

31. Simmons, 'Learning to Live with NGOs', p. 83.

32. Susan Strange, 'States, firms and diplomacy,' *International Affairs*, vol.68, no. 1 (January 1992).

33. Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998. Cf. Ralf Dahrendorf, 'The Third Way and Liberty', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no.5 (September/October 1999).

34. My working definition for innovation is "a capacity for nontrivial change, involving the mobilisation of ideas, institutions, and people in ways that serve not only the interests of one's own organisation, but also a wider community". This definition is adapted from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *Creativity in Statecraft*, Wash. DC: Library of Congress, 1983, p. 3. On innovation in general, see H.G. Barnett, *Innovation: The Basis of Cultural Change*, New York: McGraw Hill, 1953. On diplomatic innovation, see Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*; and Hocking, *Foreign Ministries*. On foreign policy innovation, see Laura Neack, Jeanne A.K. Hey, and Patrick J. Haney (eds.), *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995; and Jerel A. Rosati, Joe D. Hagan, and Martin W. Sampson III (eds.), *Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change*, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994.

35. Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984; Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991; Kimberley Marten Zisk, *Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991*, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993; and Richard K. Betts, *Military Readiness*, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995.

36. Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998, ch. 33.

37. Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 238.

38. Schlesinger, *Creativity in Statecraft*.

39. A fine exception is David Mayers, *The Ambassadors and America's Soviet Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. For an interesting account by a practising diplomat, see Ken Berry, *Cambodia-From Red to Blue: Australia's Initiative for Peace*, St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1997.

40. Adam Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States*, London: Methuen, 1982; and Hocking, *Foreign Ministries*. For a journalistic appraisal, see Tim Zimmermann, 'Twilight of the diplomats,' *U.S. News & World Report*, January 27, 1997.

41. I believe the cocktail remark is Hedley Bull's, and thank Iver Neumann for drawing it to my attention.

42. Stearns, *Talking To Strangers*, p. 124. This problem is accentuated by tight budget constraints on the U.S. Department of State, in contrast to Congressional permissiveness on defence spending. See Lawrence Eagleburger and Robert L. Barry, 'Dollars and Sense Diplomacy,' *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1996, pp. 2-8; and Jonathan Clarke and James Clad, *After the Crusade: American Foreign Policy for the Post-Superpower Age*, Lanham: Madison Books, 1995, pp. 27-38.

43. For an excellent review of the state of diplomatic studies, see Paul Sharp, 'For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations.' *International Studies Review*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1999).

44. Schlesinger, *Creativity in Statecraft*, p. 21.

45. W.W. Rostow, 'Jean Monnet: The Innovator as Diplomat,' in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.), *The Diplomats, 1939-1979*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994. See also Oran Young: 'Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions in international society,' *International Organization*, vol. 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991). For a sophisticated counter-argument, see Andrew Moravcsik, 'A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation,' *International Organization*, vol. 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999).

46. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York, United Nations, 1992; and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga*, New York: Random House, 1999; pp. 27-29. On the origins of preventive diplomacy, see Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, New York: Harper & Row, 1984, esp. chs. 10 & 11. See also Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*. On prospects for reforming the UN, see also Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (eds.), *United Nations, Divided World*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993; and Robert W. Cox, 'The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization,' *International Organization*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 1969).

47. Stearns provides some support for this conclusion, *Talking To Strangers*, p.143. See also Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*, p. 157.

48. On "two-level games," see Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games,' *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988). On "learning" in international relations, see, for example, George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock (eds.), *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991; and Jack Levy, 'Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,' *International Organization*, vol. 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994).

49. Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*, Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993.

50. The term is from Stearns, *Talking To Strangers*, p. 114. In the Australian foreign service, "entrepreneurship" became one criterion for promotion in the 1980s. On maintaining an innovative organisational culture, see Paul C. Light, *Sustaining Innovation: Creating Nonprofit and Government Organizations That Innovate Naturally*, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1998. On the trend in the U.S. foreign service, see Greg Steinmetz and Robert S. Greenberger, 'Open for Business,' *The Wall Street Journal*, January 21, 1997, pp. A1, A12.

51. See Langhorne, 'Current Developments.' See also Stearns, *Talking To Strangers*, pp. 134-5.

52. There is a vast "leadership" literature; see esp. James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership*, New York: Harper & Row, 1978. On "norm entrepreneurs", see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,' *International Organization*, vol.52, no.4 (Autumn 1998), esp. pp.256-9. On new "ideas", see Jeff T. Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1997.

53. Stearns, *Talking To Strangers*, p. 85.

54. Stearns, *Talking To Strangers*, pp. 145-6.

55. Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*, Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1991; and J.L. Richardson, *Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

56. Simmons, 'Learning to Live with NGOs,' p.91; and Stearns, *Talking To Strangers*, p. 118.

57. On "middle power theory," see Cranford Pratt (ed.), *Internationalism under Strain: The North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden*, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989; and Cranford Pratt (ed.), *Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension*, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990. See also Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy*; Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers*; and Donna Lee, 'Middle powers in the global economy,' *Review of International Studies*, vol. 24, no. 4 (October 1998). On "small states", see David Vital,

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The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict, London: Oxford University Press, 1971; R.P. Barston (ed.), *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States*, New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973; John Scott Masker, *Small States and Security Regimes*, Lanham, MD: University of America Press, 1995; Robert Keohane, 'The Big Influence of Small Allies', *Foreign Policy*, no. 2 (Spring 1971); and Keohane, 'Lilliputians' Dilemmas.' On the strategy of tapping transnational relations as a bargaining tool of weak states, see Chung-in Moon, 'Complex Interdependence and Transnational Lobbying: South Korea in the United States', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 32 (1988).

58. An article that defines and sets the standard for scholarly debate on this issue from a transnational norms perspective is Richard Price, 'Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines', *International Organization*, vol. 52, no. 3 (Summer 1998).

59. John English, 'The Ottawa Process: Paths Followed, Paths Ahead,' *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 52, no. 2 (July 1998). See also Simmons, 'Learning to Live with NGOs', pp. 84, 91.

60. Jocelyn Coulon, *Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order*, trans. Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994, esp. ch. 2; and Geoffrey Hayes, 'Canada as a Middle Power: The Case of Peacekeeping', in Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy*.

61. Berry, *Cambodia*.

62. For example, in 1989, Australia hosted in Canberra an international government-industry conference against chemical weapons, attended by representatives of 66 countries and the world's chemical industry.

63. Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Canberra: Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, August 1996. On the Commission as an example of creative, middle power diplomacy, see Marianne Hanson and Carl Ungerer, 'The Canberra Commission: Paths Followed, Paths Ahead', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 53, no. 1 (April 1999). For a critical review on the Commission's conclusions on disarmament, see Lawrence Freedman, 'Nuclear Weapons: From Marginalisation to Elimination?', *Survival*, vol. 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997).

64. Keohane, 'Lilliputians' Dilemmas', pp. 295-6.

65. Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy*.

66. E.g., Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*. One major exception is Peter Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

67. Simmons, 'Learning to Live with NGOs'.

68. Simmons, 'Learning to Live with NGOs', p. 84. See also Alison Van Rooy, 'A New Diplomacy?: How Ambassadors (Should) Deal with Civil Society Organisations', in Robert Wolfe (ed.), *Diplomatic Missions: The Ambassador in Canadian Foreign Policy*, Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queens University, 1997. On private military companies, or modern "mercenaries", see David Shearer, 'Outsourcing War', *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1998.

69. Sant'Egidio's New York representative Andrea Bartoli reportedly described this effort as "the first intergovernmental agreement ever negotiated by a non-governmental body", see Lewis, 'Not Just Governments Make War or Peace', p. A21. See also Andrea Bartoli, 'Mozambicans Negotiating Through Third Parties: The Role of the Community of St. Egidio', in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds.), *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, forthcoming.

70. Simmons, 'Learning to Live with NGOs,' pp. 88-90.

71. The details on CSCAP in this paragraph are taken verbatim from membership documents of the U.S. CSCAP Committee. The Committee's secretariat is based at Pacific Forum CSIS, Hawaii.

72. There is an emerging body of relevant "inside-the-region" literature, reflecting this observation. See, for example, Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998; and Chan Heng Chee (ed.), *The New Asia-Pacific Order*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997.

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On “inter-regional” security co-operation, see Hanns Maull, Gerald Segal and Jusuf Wanandi (eds.), *Europe and the Asia Pacific*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998. On the rise of regional networks and epistemic communities, see Peter Katzenstein, *Network Power: Japan and Asia*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997. For more sceptical appraisals, see Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, ‘Rethinking East Asian Security’, *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 2 (Summer 1994); and Michael Leifer, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN’s Model of Regional Security*, Adelphi Paper 302, Oxford: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 1996.

73. Simmons suggests that these comments were counter-productive; ‘Learning to Live with NGOs’, p. 90.

74. On the professionalism and “growing respectability” of NGOs in the 1990s, see Mary Kaldor, ‘Transnational civil society’, in Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.), *Human Rights in Global Politics*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 202–3.