

Fragile States and Sustainable Peacebuilding¹

INTERNATIONAL MOMENTUM

Peacebuilding has moved back to the top of international agendas since the tragic events of September 11, 2001. In recent years, major post-war or post-invasion operations have been launched in countries such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq, and Sudan. Most of these involve the large-scale deployment of international peacekeepers or stabilization forces. Some are mobilizing vast funds to rebuild damaged infrastructure, reactivate economies, and lay the foundations for democratic governance. Others involve attempts to build peace while fighting war — Iraq being the most controversial case, but comparable operations are unfolding elsewhere.

At the Millennium Review Summit in September 2005, the United Nations and its member states agreed to establish a Peacebuilding Commission to improve the coordination of such operations. The Commission will link the efforts of host governments to those of UN agencies, other multilateral bodies such as the World Bank and regional organizations, as well as donors and troop contributors. It will report to the Security Council during crises and in the immediate post-war period. After that, it may report to the UN Economic and Social Council on the long-term challenges of peacebuilding. This could advance the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine — first proposed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 2001 — including its integrated approach for responding to grave humanitarian crises.

UN processes intersect with efforts in other fora. Through the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), donors are formulating principles for their engagement in fragile states. Some northern governments have already established mechanisms to enhance their roles in such contexts. In the late 1990s, the UK led the way by experimenting with new modalities to pool funds and otherwise “join up” British peacebuilding and conflict-prevention efforts. More recently, the US Department of State created the Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate US government engagement in fragile states. Middle powers are developing their own mechanisms.

Opportunities and concerns

On the surface this seems encouraging, since there is clearly a need for quicker and more robust international responses to certain humanitarian crises, as well as coordinated responses combining governance and socio-economic reforms over the longer term. Yet many stakeholders are deeply concerned about the tendency of certain international actors to privilege the use of force especially since 9/11, the conflictive outcomes of recent international interventions, and the mixed results of earlier peacebuilding efforts.



¹ This brief is an output of the “What Kind of Peace is Possible?” (WKOP) project, a partnership between institutions in eight countries. WKOP is funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Ford Foundation, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). See www.nsi-ins.ca for more information. The policy recommendations for Canada also draw on NSI’s engagement with the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) and the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC).

Opportunities and concerns (continued)

What have been the results of different peacebuilding experiences over the short-term and long-term? What are the outcomes in the areas of democratic governance and economic recovery, nationally and locally? What factors explain distinct outcomes: What have been the impacts of different international military interventions on peacebuilding? How have relations of power between conservative and reformist national forces — including gender relations — affected outcomes? As such, what kind of peace is possible in the post-9/11 era? These are the questions that the “What Kind of Peace is Possible?” project (WKOP), a collaborative initiative by partners in eight countries, has been grappling with since 2003. WKOP resulted from our participation in debates on the results of peacebuilding efforts in our countries and elsewhere, and our common desire to contribute to more sustainable outcomes through evidence-based policy dialogue.

Six cases were selected to advance this agenda. Two of these — Guatemala and Mozambique — are widely considered cases of “relative success” because wars have been terminated, ex-combatants have been demobilized, and there has been progress in the area of democratic development. Two more — Haiti

and the Palestinian Territories — are societies in which ambitious attempts to build peace during the 1990s failed and violence re-emerged with a vengeance. In both cases, the prospects of current attempts to build peace are uncertain at best. The final cases — Afghanistan and Sri Lanka — both experienced military interventions and peace efforts during the Cold War. Afghanistan is engaged in an attempt to build peace on the heels of a more multilateral military intervention. In Sri Lanka, the search for a negotiated solution remains at an impasse. A common feature of these two situations is the difficulty of advancing bold reforms and participatory processes that could contribute decisively to sustainable peace. This brief summarizes the findings from these six case studies and sets out policy recommendations for Canadian officials and for their partners in selected contexts.

Revisiting “relative success” in Guatemala and Mozambique

From a UN perspective, these two countries were theatres for quintessential second-generation peace operations — missions that went beyond classical peacekeeping to encompass peacebuilding tasks such as the demobilization of combatants, electoral monitoring, human rights promotion, and assistance with economic reforms. From the perspective of the host countries, these were also exemplary experiences of national organizations taking over complex peacebuilding processes that were necessarily driven by external agencies during the peacemaking and initial post-war periods.

In both cases, many domestic and external actors agree that peacebuilding has brought enormous advances. Long, costly, and tragic wars have ended. The resurgence of violent conflict on the same scale is not on the horizon in either case. Tens of thousands of ex-combatants were demobilized; hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally-displaced persons were resettled. Several rounds of elections have been held — these are widely viewed as having been free and fair. In both contexts, elections have been part of broader democratization processes with important local dimensions. Particularly in Mozambique, war termination has been accompanied by sustained macro-economic growth rates — averaging 8 per cent annually since 1994. Women and other historically-excluded populations have played important roles in these processes.

Yet these impressive accomplishments reflect only some of the expectations of key stakeholders, and include only some of the changes that were seen as essential to consolidating peace over the long-term. Two deficits are particularly salient in this regard. The first is in the area of democratization, since increased freedom and participation have not been followed by deeper changes in power relations. In Guatemala and Mozambique, this is especially evident at the local level where democratic governance remains the exception to the rule. The second major deficit is in the area of socio-economic development. Even in Mozambique, the benefits of growth

have not reached most poor people in the countryside. A limited process of decentralization — encompassing only 33 of Mozambique’s 151 cities and major towns, and applied unevenly in municipalities where the RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana/Mozambican National Resistance) opposition has much public support — reflects these tendencies. As the Mayor of Nacala in northern Mozambique noted in 2004: “...there isn’t decentralization because ...control by the central government remains strong and that doesn’t give the municipalities the tools to work efficiently.”

Despite the gaps between what has been accomplished and what was deemed necessary to secure lasting peace, our Guatemalan and Mozambican partners have concluded that the foundations have been laid for conflict-transforming changes. What remains imperative in both societies now is for national governmental bodies — particularly the Executive and Legislature — to cooperate with other national organizations to substantially extend the reach of conflict-sensitive development processes beyond their capitals and beyond the privileged few. Deeper decentralization, as well as a recommitment to local development in its political and economic dimensions, is essential to forging sustainable peace. Despite some worrisome trends, there appears to remain considerable space for moving in this direction in the post-9/11 era — at least in these two societies.

Learning from failure? Haiti and the Palestinian Territories

It is obvious that there are profound differences between these two cases. For the past two decades, Haiti has experienced conflicts — though not civil war — between two major domestic political-economic forces. These conflicts have salient international dimensions — indeed regimes were changed through international military interventions in 1994 and 2004. Yet this is fundamentally different from the situation in the Palestinian Territories where the conflict is primarily an international conflict between a strong Israeli state and a weak Palestinian Authority. Other salient differences include US predominance and the weakness of multilateral bodies in the Middle East, the resulting contrast between major UN peace roles in Haiti and minor

UN peace roles in the Palestinian Territories and, of course, the fact that there is no exact Haitian parallel to the Oslo Peace Accords.

Despite these enormous differences, it is instructive to analyze Haiti and Palestine together because they share common elements. During the mid-1990s, both were held up as beacons of post-Cold War peacebuilding. There was some credibility to these claims because both experienced notable achievements. In both cases internal pressures and external interventions combined to generate political change: the reinstatement of the constitutionally-elected president and the initiation of political reforms in Haiti, and the return of the Palestine Liberation Organization's government-in-exile and establishment of the Palestinian Authority under its leadership. In both cases there were socio-economic reforms and a macroeconomic upturn. Local development was part of both governments' official plans.

Yet, in both cases, such initial achievements masked major flaws that were revealed by a withering of the peace consensus and the return of organized violence within



Canada and the 3Ds in fragile states

In April 2005, the Government of Canada released an International Policy Statement elaborating on its commitment to integrated “3D” responses to state fragility, combining diplomacy, defence and development. Concrete initiatives include:

- Enhancing Canadian Forces' capacities for quick deployment of sizeable, well-equipped forces for international peacekeeping and stabilization operations.
- Expanding Foreign Affairs' capacity to lead Canadian responses to crises and assistance in sensitive areas such as security sector reform, through the Stabilization & Reconstruction Taskforce and the Global Peace & Security Fund.
- Consolidating CIDA and other Canadian capacities for longer-term contributions to good governance, economic, and social development in fragile states through Canada Corps and other mechanisms.

Guatemala

Peacebuilding has brought enormous benefits to this Central American country since the final peace accords were signed in December 1996. These include:

- War termination and the demobilization of about 25,000 ex-Armed Forces and 1,000 guerrilla ex-combatants.
- A consolidation of democratic electoral processes, and a new laws to decrease the exclusion of Indigenous Peoples.
- Advances in decentralization through the Development Councils, and participatory development structures from the community to the district and national levels.

Yet key peace accord commitments have not been implemented:

- Successive legislatures have failed to pass peace accord laws in key areas like fiscal reform and the regularization of Indigenous Peoples' lands.
- Minimal tax reforms were not implemented and public expenditures have not been redistributed from security to social priorities like health and education.
- Decentralization remains limited in practice. Increased participation by women and Indigenous Peoples has not yet led to their influence on major local decisions.

This mixed record is due to a number of factors:

- Implementation of the peace accords was limited by the convergence of strategies among reformist elites in government, former guerrilla leaders, organized civil society, and the international community led by the UN. The limitations were also due to the temporary disorganization of domestic conservative networks.
- The latter — parts of government such as Congress and the Judiciary, parts of the domestic corporate sector, and former members of the civil defence patrols — regrouped to resist the implementation of far-reaching peacebuilding reforms.

The peace process could still lead to sustainable peace if the Berger Government:

- Works with Congress to adopt legislation codifying key peace commitments.
- Renews efforts to raise taxation levels to generate the national resources needed to finance pending commitments in areas like rural development.
- Actively supports efforts by the Development Councils to contribute to peacebuilding by nurturing their capacities for revenue generation, financial management and public engagement.

Development Councils and civil society organizations (CSOs) should devise clearer strategies to secure the implementation of pending peace accords and strengthen the participation of women, Indigenous Peoples and the poor in development processes. The international community should deepen its support to change agents in government, to the councils and CSOs that are contributing to these measures, and to the agenda of sustainable peacebuilding over the long run.

Learning from failure? Haiti and the Palestinian Territories (continued)

a few years. One flaw in both transitions was the distorted character of democratization processes. The Palestine Liberation Organization struggled to maintain control of a centralized Palestinian Authority that placed regime survival and Israeli security priorities ahead of democratic development. In Haiti, the Lavalas Movement undermined the construction of independent democratic institutions such as the Electoral Council and subordinated decentralization processes to its partisan aims. Another major flaw was that the benefits of economic recovery were neither solidly-based nor widely-shared. In Haiti the economy went back into recession by 1997; in Palestine the recession came after the al Aqsa Intifada started in 2000. With important differences, in both societies the economic downturn aggravated social discontent, fuelled violence, and chipped away at what was left of the peace edifice. In both cases, failed peacebuilding resulted in the creation or perpetuation of fragile states.

These trends — initial peacebuilding achievements masking major flaws in the areas of democratic and economic development that eventually shattered peace — can also be partly explained by common factors. One of them is that the strategies of illiberal elites converged with those of external pow-

ers to stunt the development of democratic institutions, decentralization, and socio-political inclusion. In both cases, despite their commitment and substantial funding for democratic development, donors failed to take a coordinated, long-term approach to the promotion of democracy. Another factor is that the orthodox models of economic stabilization adopted in both cases, at the behest of donors, were vulnerable to fluctuations in external assistance and to domestic political turmoil.

In both cases, national and international agencies also failed to protect civilians from human rights violations — despite initial investments in security justice sector reform and despite the deployment of a major international presence in Haiti. In Israel and Palestine, peacekeepers were not deployed to facilitate peacebuilding.

Uncertain futures: Afghanistan and Sri Lanka

Afghanistan and Sri Lanka are also an unexpected combination since they are clearly distinct. In Afghanistan, there are interlocking conflicts between a weak central government led by liberal reformers and backed by the formal international community, versus Islamic conservatives backed by a transnational Islamic movement, and regional warlords with their own agendas. An ambitious peacebuilding experiment is underway there, on the basis of agreements negotiated after the US-led invasion in October 2001. In Sri Lanka, there is currently a state of “no war, no peace” between the Sinhalese-based central government and a divided ethnic autonomy movement, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). Peacebuilding is on hold pending the possible conclusion of peace talks. Each society is embedded in complex international relations, with regional powers playing key roles in each case, and with the West staking out a major role in Afghanistan compared to its limited engagement in Sri Lanka.

Yet despite these differences, there are less-visible commonalities. In both cases there is widespread recognition that peacebuilding requires fundamental changes over the long-term, including in secondary cities and in the countryside. However, in both cases there has been a tendency to revert to short-term expediency, in areas like security and economic policy, and key actors have been able to block movement towards the fundamental changes that are required to build sustainable peace.

Even before the peace talks in Sri Lanka reached a deadlock in April 2003, several obstacles had emerged that made sustained progress difficult. On the one hand, the LTTE leadership had shown little sensitivity to other stakeholders’ demands that any devolution of power to the North and East be conditioned on a democratization of LTTE practices. On the other hand, the United National Front (UNF) government was unable to respond positively to LTTE proposals for interim arrange-

ments that would have tested a model of regional autonomy. The UNF government’s position was weakened by its orthodox market-oriented economic policies that failed to distribute the peace dividend to the North and East, or to the rural poor in the South. In April 2004, this resulted in the election of a coalition government led by the Peoples’ Alliance that has even less margin to return to the negotiation table. At the same time and despite mediation efforts by the Norwegian government, the LTTE felt increasingly sidelined by other international actors due to the global war on terror. Finally, notwithstanding the creation of a Civil Society Sub-Committee on Peace and Reconciliation, civil society has remained marginal to the peace talks. These dynamics, the pressure they have put on the ceasefire agreement, and the tragic destruction caused by the Tsunami in December 2004 have made it difficult to keep creative options for transformative peacebuilding on the agenda.

The Palestinian Territories

The 1993 and 1995 Oslo Peace Accords initially brought significant peace dividends to Palestinians and Israelis:

- Israel withdrew from parts of the occupied territories, and Palestinians curtailed their attacks on Israeli targets.
- The Palestine Liberation Organization returned to establish the Palestinian Authority; this included holding elections for the Legislative Council.
- The economy grew at an average of 5 per cent per year between 1995 and 2000.

Yet flaws in the Accords and in their implementation sowed the seeds of failure:

- The Executive branch and the PLO old guard maintained control over power, resisted demands for accountability to the Legislative Council and the Judiciary, and put off demands to incorporate opposition movements through local elections.
- The interim nature of the peace agreements, as well as their tendency to privilege the short-term security priorities of Israel and the PLO old guard, converged to undermine human rights and democratic development over the longer term.

Afghanistan

The international intervention against the Taliban government in October 2001 and the implementation of the Bonn Agreement since have brought benefits to Afghanistan:

- Complex processes of constitutional reform and democratic consultation led to relatively free presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004-2005.
- The demobilization and disarmament of non-state combatants has begun, as has large-scale reconstruction in some areas.
- There have also been important initiatives in areas like women's rights and an amnesty for Taliban cadres who lay down their arms.

Yet these initial achievements are fragile:

- The war between Taliban and Al-Qaida forces on the one hand, and US-led coalition forces on the other, continues in the southern and eastern provinces.
- The central state remains weak and unable to deliver basic goods such as public security. Internationally-staffed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are problematic substitutes for an expanded central government presence, though a shift by some PRTs to strengthening provincial administrations seems promising.
- Rural development, a key to peacebuilding in a country where 70 per cent of the population lives in rural areas, remains incipient — outside the opium economy.

- The international community was unable to deploy peacekeepers or observers due to opposition by the government of Israel and US support for that position.
- This provided fertile ground for the second Intifada in 2000. Renewed violence and re-occupation drove the economy into recession, narrowed democratic spaces, and fueled the popularity of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the PLO nationalist new guard.
- The current unilateral Israeli disengagement process, the Israeli security wall, and continued settlement construction in the West Bank perpetuate these tendencies.

Currently there are positive developments that should be supported, including:

- The phased local elections that began in December 2004 are due to culminate in December 2005. These have already opened significant spaces for the participation of opposition movements and women in democratic politics.
- The move towards Legislative Council elections tentatively planned for January 2006, as well as legal and institutional reforms to ensure their fairness.
- Attempts to revive the Quartet Roadmap talks and move towards a permanent status agreement that addresses fundamental issues.

What are the prospects for this scenario? According to the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research: "... little progress is possible without solid international intervention; yet successful Palestinian peacebuilding is more likely a mission impossible for the international community of the ... post 9/11 era."

The National Solidarity Program (NSP) reflects the mixed results of peacebuilding:

- The NSP was initiated by the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) in 2003, to foster participatory development and to improve relations between rural communities and the central state. By September 2005, almost 9,000 of Afghanistan's 20,000 villages had been reached through small NSP projects. These generally include the participatory elaboration and implementation of community development initiatives in areas such as transportation infrastructure and public health. To be eligible for an NSP grant, communities must elect a Community Development Council (CDC) with male and female representatives.
- The reach already achieved by the NSP is impressive. The experience of local participation has been positive for many communities, including women. Yet the sustainability of NSP projects is questionable. Evidence from four communities suggests that consultation with stakeholders is inadequate, that regional warlords and local commanders retain much influence, while women and the poor remain marginal to major decisions. Moreover community-level projects lack connections to each other or to broader rural development programs.

Much could be done to change these dynamics:

- At the macro level, the Karzai Government and the international community could renew attempts to harmonize their policies with the goal of sustainable peacebuilding. This could include shifting more decisively from war-fighting to engagement with the Taliban, ensuring that the PRTs strengthen rather than bypass provincial administrations, and shifting resources towards greater investment in good governance and socio-economic development.
- At the program level this could involve providing longer-term funding to the NSP to broaden the reach and ensure the sustainability of its rural development efforts. MRRD, facilitating partners, and development councils should strengthen their capacities to apply good practices of participatory development at the project design, implementation and evaluation stages — including finding more effective ways of nurturing participation by women and the poor at the community level.

What is likely to happen in real life? According to the Afghanistan Center for Policy and Development Studies:

"Afghanistan is often depicted as being in a post-conflict situation, but questions remain about whether this is an accurate description. While peace could be on the horizon, the distance to that horizon is unclear ... rural development could perhaps be the most critical issue in determining whether it is peace or conflict that is on the horizon for Afghanistan."

CONCLUSIONS

This comparative analysis reminds us that the possibilities for peacebuilding vary considerably across time and space. The experiences of Guatemala and Mozambique, where long-term outcomes can be observed, demonstrate that peacebuilding is possible: wars can be ended, democratization can be advanced, economic recovery can occur, and national leadership can be re-established. These countries' accomplishments are based on peace agreements that were painstakingly negotiated between the belligerents over years, with international mediation. Clearly these achievements are insufficient: the limits of democratization, decentralization, and socio-economic development, especially in the countryside, could undermine peace if they are not addressed. Nonetheless, WKOP partners believe that there can be further progress towards sustainable peacebuilding through measures such as more inclusive local and rural development, fiscal reform, and women's greater participation, despite the constraints of the post-9/11 environment.

The experiences of Haiti and the Palestinian Territories remind us that even such limited steps towards sustainable peacebuilding are difficult to achieve. Despite considerable accomplishments, both societies experienced renewed violence, economic recession, and the collapse of transitional processes after a few years. This was due to factors such as the incomplete nature of the transitional agreements, their failure to address fundamental causes of conflict, and the resistance of national and international actors to deeper democratic and socio-economic reforms. That these failures took place during the enabling environment of the post-Cold War years should give us pause. They remind us that conservative forces of different stripes — much more varied than the narrow spectrum of criminal elements evoked by the concept of “spoilers” — can easily converge to stunt peacebuilding efforts and perpetuate state fragility. The scope for such convergence has grown in the post-9/11 era. In Palestine, WKOP partners have concluded that it may be impossible for the international community to achieve the kind of coherence required to counterbalance conservative forces at the national and regional level, at least for now.

The prospects for sustainable peace in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka also remain uncertain. In Haiti, peacebuilding is constrained by its return on the heels of a highly contested international intervention, and by the recurrence of tendencies such as electoral expediency that undermined efforts

in the 1990s. In Afghanistan, peacebuilding is constrained by protracted war and by enormous challenges in the areas of democratic state-building and participatory socio-economic development. In Sri Lanka, peacemaking efforts are focused on maintaining the ceasefire and renewing the peace talks; as such, it remains difficult to broaden participation in the peace process and advance deeper institutional changes that might transform the conflict. In sum, post-9/11 politics opened spaces for change in all three countries but new emphases on short-term stability have restricted options for long-term transformation and escape from fragility.

Yet even in these difficult circumstances, stakeholders have policy options. The key is to focus on the long-term goal of sustainable peacebuilding and more systematically support agents of change that are working towards that goal. Drawing on seminal research by the World Bank, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recently reminded us that:

“Roughly half of all countries that emerge from war lapse back into violence within five years ... [I]f we are going to prevent conflict we must ensure that peace agreements are implemented in a ... sustainable manner.”

— (Explanatory Note by the Secretary General on the proposed Peacebuilding Commission, April 17, 2005)

This brief sets out options in this regard for Canadian agencies. The briefs noted on the back page offer more extensive recommendations for stakeholders in the six Southern focus countries and in Norway.

Policy options for Canada


The 3D approach that the Canadian government adopted in 2004, and elaborated on in the 2005 International Policy Statement (IPS), provides a promising starting-point framework for contributing to peacebuilding and responding to the broader challenges of state fragility. Enhancing Department of National Defence capacities to deploy properly equipped and trained military forces in a timely manner could enable Canada to increase its contributions to peacekeeping and human protection operations. By establishing the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF), the government could significantly strengthen Foreign Affairs' capacity for immedi-

ate post-war peacebuilding and crisis response, especially in areas of peace operations and security sector reform that are not eligible for official development assistance. CIDA's emerging Strategic Framework for Engagement in Fragile States offers a sound approach to orient its longer-term engagement in vulnerable societies. The Stabilization and Reconstruction Taskforce (START) may enable the government to deepen synergies between these activities.²

²For more detailed analyses of Canadian policy and programming in this area see Stephen Baranyi, « Quel avenir pour le Canada et la consolidation de la paix? Innovation et efficacité dans une période de turbulences » in Yvan Conoir et Gérard Herna, eds. *Faire la Paix* (Québec : Les Presses de l'Université de Laval, 2005) ; Stephen Baranyi, « Canada and the peace and security pillar of the Millennium Declaration » in *Towards 2015: Meeting our Millennium Commitments* (Ottawa : The North-South Institute, 2005); Stephen Baranyi and Kristiana Powell, « Bringing gender back into Canada's engagement in fragile states. » NSI paper for CIDA, August 2005 — available on www.nsi-ins.ca.

However for these innovations to be effective, they will have to be implemented in ways that contribute centrally to the goals of sustainable peacebuilding and conflict prevention. As such, the Government of Canada should:

- Be more judicious about participating in military interventions and military-led reconstruction operations, since experience shows that it is very difficult to move from these to sustainable peacebuilding, especially post-9/11. As noted in a recent brief by the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee: “Democracy and good governance cannot be coerced out of the barrel of a gun. The foundation for sustainable peacebuilding is the consent of the parties and local ownership.” The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) criteria that Canada champions worldwide should be used more systematically and openly to decide whether and how Canada participates in foreign military operations and reconstruction processes.
- Ensure that the peacebuilding activities supported by the GPSF are consistent with established international human rights norms, key international commitments such as UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, emerging R2P principles, and guidelines for good donorship developed through the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). This is especially important in sensitive areas such as security sector reform. Canada must also ensure that GPSF funding directed at immediate post-crisis activities effectively lays foundations for sustainable peacebuilding, and does not end up crowding out vital contributions to priorities such as poverty reduction in fragile states.
- Strengthen CIDA’s financial, analytical, and operational capacity to support long-term peacebuilding programming in critical areas such as democratic governance and socio-economic development, nationally and at the local level. This should include maintaining significant funding for long-term support of selected peacebuilding processes, similar to the funding levels for “crisis states.”
- Experiment, in peacebuilding situations and in other fragile states, with new ways of institutionalizing cooperation with elite and grassroots agents of change — to ensure that marginalized actors such as Indigenous Peoples, the



poor, women, and opposition movements can participate in peaceful change.

- Invest more resources, including senior-level attention, to develop a common understanding of the gender dimensions of military intervention, military-led reconstruction operations, and long-term peacebuilding across relevant government departments.
- Ensure that Canada’s contributions to peacemaking balance an appreciation for short-term security imperatives with the need to address structural drivers of war through long-term, transformative strategies in areas such as rural development.

Exactly how Canada puts this approach into practice will vary by country, since the possibilities and constraints for sustainable peacebuilding are situation-specific.

- In *Afghanistan*, Canada should transparently monitor and evaluate the efforts of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar. It should seek a better balance between investing in the International Security Assistance Force versus longer-term priorities such as rural development. Canada should more actively support the National Solidarity Program and help strengthen its capacity to facilitate genuinely participatory rural development processes.
- In *Guatemala*, Canada should remain engaged in long-term peacebuilding. CIDA should maintain cooperation in critical areas where it has experience, such as promoting gender equality, equitable fiscal reform, and democratic local governance.
- In *Haiti*, Canada should continue supporting the full deployment and proper conduct of MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti/United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti), reforms to the National Police, the holding of democratic elections, and the implementation of the Interim Cooperation Framework. At the same time, Canadian officials should be more open to evaluating results to date, and to constructively discussing options that might bring the goal of long-term sustainability back into the centre of decision-making.
- In the *Palestinian Territories*, Canada should actively raise concerns about the negative aspects of unilateral Israeli steps, and advocate a return to the Quartet Roadmap to permanent status negotiations. It should encourage the emergence of a more inclusive political system and support moves towards parliamentary and local elections, while increasing its assistance to strengthen municipal capacities for democratic governance and inclusive socio-economic development.
- In *Mozambique*, Canada should continue supporting long-term peacebuilding through its primary engagement in the health sector. Through its governance programming, CIDA should explore ways of supporting the elaboration and implementation of a national strategy for democratic decentralization to complement its support for the Federation of Canadian Municipalities and the National Association of Municipalities partnership.

Policy options for Canada (continued)

- In *Sri Lanka*, Canada should redouble its advocacy for a return to peace talks while exploring ways to help broaden participation in the new talks. It should remain actively engaged in post-Tsunami reconstruction while ensuring that assistance does not further polarize divided communities. Canada should continue sharing lessons we have learned about federalism with Sri Lankan stakeholders, including those most opposed at the moment to far-reaching reforms.

Canada can also leverage its contributions to sustainable peacebuilding through its engagement in multilateral processes.

- In the OECD DAC, Canada should work with Norway and others to follow up on the 2004 Utstein report's recommendations regarding the strategic evaluation of peacebuilding activities. This should ensure that new evaluation guidelines include provisions to assess long-term peacebuilding impacts and involve civil society stakeholders in evaluation processes, nationally and at the local level.
- In the DAC Learning and Advisory Process (LAP) on difficult partnerships, Canada should help strengthen language pertaining to the promotion of gender equality, human rights, and long-term engagement — in the draft Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States. Canada should continue playing a lead role in piloting these emerging principles in Haiti, while engaging more CSOs in this process in Canada and especially on the ground in that country. Canada should also take advantage of DAC LAP processes in other countries such as Sudan, where it can work closely with Norway, to learn from new approaches to programing in fragile states in a more open, transparent manner.
- In the follow-up to the United Nations Millennium Review Summit, Canada should support the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, a Fund for Peacebuilding, and a Peacebuilding Support Office in the Secretariat. Canada should contribute substantially to the Voluntary Fund. It should monitor the performance of these bodies to ensure that initial peacebuilding efforts coordinated through the Commission lay solid foundations for sustainable peacebuilding, among other things by dynamically linking oversight by the Security Council to oversight by the Economic and Social Council. Canada should advocate engagement of international financial institutions and other donors in the Commission's deliberations, overall and in priority countries. It is essential for this engagement to be based on actual experiences in post-war reconstruction and not on the rigid orthodoxies of market-oriented reform.
- In the DAC, the UN and in other forums, Canada should also ensure that the current preoccupation with crises does not displace the need to continue contributing to peacebuilding in countries/territories such as Guatemala, Mozambique, and the Palestinian Territories, which remain fragile in their own right and are still vital from the perspective of conflict prevention.

In these forums, Canada should also work more actively to ensure that immediate security concerns do not crowd out measures to secure "softer" changes such as gender equality, democratic participation, and sustainable rural development — given the intrinsic importance of such goals and their links with the equally fundamental goal of long-term conflict prevention.

WKOP Resources

Omar Zakhilwal and Jane Thomas. "Afghanistan: What kind of peace is possible? Rural Development and Peacebuilding" and policy brief forthcoming from the Afghanistan Center for Policy and Development Studies, 2005.

Gabriel Aguilera et al. "Guatemala: Entre la paz posible y la paz deseable" and "Guatemala: ¿qué clase de paz es posible?". Guatemala: Programa de Participación y Democracia, 2005.

Hérard Jadotte. Working paper and policy brief forthcoming from the Université de Notre Dame d'Haïti, 2005.

Khalil Shikaki. "What kind of peace is possible? The case of Palestine: 1993-2005" and policy brief forthcoming from the Palestinian Center for Policy Survey Research, 2005.

Eduardo Siteo and Carolina Hanguana. Working paper and policy brief forthcoming from the Centro de Estudios de Democracia y Desarrollo, 2005.

Jayadeva Uyangoda. "Transition from Civil War to Peace: Challenges of Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka" and policy brief forthcoming from the Social Scientists Association, 2005.

Arne Strand, Kristian Harpviken, and Wenche Hauge. "Fighting for peace: the role of former combatants in peace processes" from the Chr. Michelsen Institute and PRIO, 2005.

Stephen Baranyi. "What kind of peace is possible in the post-9/11 era?" Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 2005.

By late October 2005 all these publications will be available on the WKOP webpage at: <http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/research/progress/p28.asp>

Hard copies will be available at the WKOP international conference in Vilankulo, Mozambique, November 20-21; at briefings in Ottawa, October 24-25; and at briefings in Oslo, November 23-24, 2005. An edited compilation of the final case studies and papers by other experts will be published as a book in 2006.



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