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Voices Frm Africa

POST WAR RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTHERN ETHIOPIA: RELIEF SOCIETY OF TIGRAY AND ITS INTERNATIONAL NGO PARTNERS

by M.A. Mohamed Salih


In this article, I intend to provide a two level trajectory. One engages the larger synthesis of Africa as a whole and varying views about it. The second depicts a regional experience in Ethiopia of post war rehabilitation in order to demystify the larger synthesis and provide a pleasant encounter of how the Relief Society of Tigray, a grassroots organization, and people of the Tigray region joined their efforts to rehabilitate their shattered lives. It is also a positive example of NGO partnerships in post war reconstruction despite mounting external and internal constraints.


Africa: Real and Imagined?

Common media images about Africa portray the continent as one with more than half a billion people, and the home for about 8% of the world's population. Africa contributes less than 2% of the world trade;1 its debt arrears constitute, in some instances, more than 50% of total gross domestic product (GDP) of some countries; in the past its GDP growth rate is slow to negative;2 and its population grows faster than its annual food growth rate. Africa is also portrayed as the continent of genocides (Rwanda, Burundi and Liberia), ethnocide (Sudan, the Western Sahara and Mauritania), decades long civil wars (Sudan, Angola, Mozambique and Eritrea), as well as problems of refugees, famine and starvation, corruption, infectious and incurable diseases such as AIDS, and other human calamities.

Another image of Africa is as one of the least populated continents on earth (second only to Australia) with fertile lands, rivers, lakes and diverse natural resources, which are the envy of tourist operators, environmentalists, pharmacological industries and gene hunters. Africa has 65% of the world's strategic minerals (copper, phosphate, gold, uranium, platinum, manganese, nickel and tin, etc.), produces 10% of the world's oil and more than 8% of the world's export commodities and tropical crops (tea, coffee, groundnuts, sesame, cotton, sisal and cocoa).3 And because Africa is less industrialized and less developed it is less polluted, and some of its intact natural wonders are also the least exploited, with diverse cultures, noble indigenous peoples, old civilizations, etc. Africa is rich, but its people are economically poor.

Yet another image of Africa often held by travellers, tourists, development workers, NGOs and humanitarian organizations is a continent of opportunities, with people who are willing to work against the odds and maintain their communities and their way of life. Some who have been to Africa may return with stories about scenic nature, wild animals and noble savages. Development workers may return home with an image of societies that treasure their way of life so much that they are better left alone. NGOs and humanitarian workers may return home with mixed feelings, and in many cases their experiences contradict those of official development agencies.


It is difficult to generalize about other peoples and continents, and in doing so one misses out on the richness of individual experiences and ways of survival. People are actively engaged in daily struggles to eke out their living and improve their lot, and while doing so they are also engaged in preparing themselves for the future. This occurs against the backdrop of reports and media images that present African peoples as if they are passively waiting for charity and impending death, without doing anything themselves. A picture is often painted of people without hope.

The translation of perceptions into positive or negative life imagery does not come from nowhere. It is often informed by the nature of the relationship between the medium and the subject it informs. As mediator, the media nurture images informed by perceptions that are not necessarily true, and even if they are they capture only part of, and not the whole story.


Conflict and Destruction

During the war of liberation against the defunct regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974 1991), the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia was known to the world for its struggle against hunger, oppression and the brutality of an unjust civil war. When homes and farms were burnt, roads were mined and transport links with the outside world severed, the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), a grassroots organization, was established in 1978 as a response to these calamities. REST has since been engaged in relief and rehabilitation, integrated sustainable development, and the procurement of financial, material and technical support.

Like most NGOs in war torn regions, REST was entrusted with the burdensome task of fending for a constituency of more than one million starving and displaced people as a result of recurrent famines. These famines were caused both by human actions (war and political instability) and natural causes such as prolonged drought in 1975 1978, 1983 1985 and 1988 1992, and extremely dry and inhospitable environmental conditions. The war not only frustrated the normal rhythm of life, it also halted any development work. No single major development activity took place, except for the concerted effort of numerous international NGOs, and bilateral and multilateral donors that wanted to meet pressing humanitarian needs.

By the 1980s the major donors to Ethiopia were the European Economic Community (EEC) and Italy, which respectively provided 14% and 19% of the total net official development assistance (ODA). Other donors were the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, which provided 8.5%, the United States (8%), World Food Programme (6.2%), Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (5.7%), Sweden (5.3%) and West Germany (5%). Most assistance was in famine relief rather than development, although some of the conservation work conducted by the World Food Programme can be considered as such.

Bilateral development assistance was largely redirected and supplemented by the increased use of NGOs as a channel for aid. In 1983 REST founded, with European NGOs from Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, the Tigray Transport and Agriculture Consortium (TTAC). The consortium assisted REST in formulating projects, monitoring and reporting on them to donors, and implementing relief work. One of the major tasks of the consortium was to help REST prepare project proposals for submission to donors and in procurement tasks. REST itself coordinates and implements most of the transport projects as a logistic base for relief and agricultural development.


In a sense REST provided an alternative channel for organizations that found it morally incorrect to disburse funds through a government in war with its own people. Particular emphasis was given to expanding survival capabilities: primary health care, education, nutrition, extension, seed banks, limited mobile veterinary services, and water and soil conservation. At the same time, efforts were made to build social capital and human resources for the future: education, primary health care, seed banks and political empowerment. The Tigray Transport and Agriculture Consortium, consisting of international NGOs working in close cooperation with REST, was established to facilitate transport of relief and emergency aid through the Sudan in order to avoid aerial bombardment by government forces. Many still ask what would have happened to the peoples of northern Ethiopia without an NGO such as REST, with its motivation and sense of responsibility.


From Relief to Development

In 1992 with the onset of peace in the Tigray region, REST decided to shift from relief to development. Its primary objective was to contribute to the attainment of food security. A number of programmes were launched including an integrated development programme, rural credit scheme, rural water supply, and soil and water conservation projects. REST, recognizing that the food deficit in Tigray will persist for some years to come, decided relief should not be given in the form of food handouts. Instead, it focused its efforts on a food for recovery programme as part of the process of implementing the shift from relief to development. For several years it experimented and adapted its organizational structure and human resources capacity and deployment in the post war era.

In 1996, REST developed a food needs plan based on realistic operational parameters after discussions with its international NGO partners. The operational plan was informed by long experience in the Tigray region and its unpredictable climatic conditions, meagre natural resources, level of socio economic development, and its recent emergence from a prolonged civil war. The plan, incorporating the objective of aiding recovery and post war rehabilitation and reconstruction, aims to rehabilitate areas with relative population pressure, acute food deficits and environmental degradation. While all beneficiaries have to work for food, only disabled and economically inactive persons receive direct (free) relief support.

In 1995 REST and other international NGO partners established the Food Aid and Food Security Consortium (FAFSC). The NGO partners include Save the Children, Oxfam, and Dutch Church AID. The consortium's objectives include sharing information and experiences and lobbying donors, government institutions, the European Union (EU), etc., regarding emergency situations, early warning, timely delivery of food relief and proper management of resources.

The relationship between the consortium members is defined by its objectives, which aim to: channel, coordinate and monitor the rational use of food aid, either locally purchased or imported, in order to address the problem of food insecurity through an integrated programme linking relief and development; promote REST's independent access to EU food aid by fostering its capacity to implement and administer food aid assistance; and promote the sharing of information and experiences among NGO members.

The responsibilities of the Food Aid and Food Security Consortium are:
-- meet at least monthly to discuss needs and rational use of food aid;

-- follow up and development regarding early warning, rainfall patterns, crop production, consumption, marketing mechanisms and infrastructures of the country;
-- lobby donors and government bodies regarding emerging situations and possible solutions;
-- share relevant information regarding food status, such as on pipelines and transportation;
-- jointly monitor the use of food aid according to approved targets;
-- ensure that the implementing agency, REST, respects guidelines set by the EU mainly in local food purchases;
-- jointly assess the availability of food to allow for local purchase targets to be met;
-- evaluate (by each NGO) implementation of projects according to the agreed standards set by the consortium; and
-- jointly lobby and possibly advise the EU and the government bodies on issues relevant to the timely availability of food aid and proper management, etc.


Reconstruction and Constraints

Some may judge REST's activities aimed at post war rehabilitation in northern Ethiopia to be "too good to be true." However, I will use material that I collected in February 1997 to illustrate the organization's achievements as well as its constraints.

In 1996 the Netherlands Organization for International Development Cooperation (NOVIB) financed the purchase of 5000 metric tons of relief food to assist REST in implementing its Integrated Food Security Programme. The project was implemented in the Tigray region's central zone, which is characterized by environmental degradation, particularly soil erosion, and persistent short fall in food needs with a long history of famine.

The objective of the project is to "introduce a development and relief programme in order to mitigate the food problems of the project area, link relief to development, induce rehabilitation of the environment and ensure food security in the long term."

The achievements of the food for recovery programme include:
-- the participation of 18,500 economically active people and 22,840 non economically active people or relief beneficiaries in food for recovery programmes;
-- intensive community level training of 5670 agricultural development cadres in soil and water conservation, reafforestation and agricultural extension;
-- maintenance of over 470 kilometres of feeder roads;4
-- water and soil conservation through terracing and tree planting;
-- area closure of 15,695 hectares for environmental regeneration;
-- development of four nurseries and purchase of materials for them; and
-- employment of 588 workers.


There are several constraints facing REST. They include the Tigray region's arid, vulnerable environmental conditions and erratic and unpredictable rainfall, and changing donor policies and priorities. For instance, while the EU aims to improve food security of the poor, economic policy reforms and liberalization of trade and markets give better opportunities to large scale producers. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1292/96 on food aid policy and food aid management and special operations in support of small scale food security as expressed in articles three, four and five, calls for building local NGO capacity to undertake operations in support of food security. Article three in particular says:

"The purpose of these operations shall be to support, using the resources available, the framing and execution of a food strategy or other measures fostering the food security of the population concerned and to encourage them to reduce their food dependency and their dependence on food aid, especially in the case of low income countries with serious food shortages. The operations must help to improve the living standards of the poorest people in the countries concerned."

The mission is of the view that EU principles and guidelines on Food Aid and Food Security could be greatly compromised by the current orientation, which uses large scale producers and rigid administrative procedures that discriminate against small, middle range producers and cooperatives.

The second constraint emanates from Tigray's poor resource base, which forces REST to be dependent on its international partners and the flow of EU food. This is one of the main hindrances to future food security based on local production unless an effort is exerted to improve food production technology, possibly by sharing experiences with other NGOs operating in arid and semi arid zones. However, activities need to be diversified without spreading REST's meagre human and financial resources too thinly. Although the diversification of activities is desirable (reducing risk with optimal use of resources), it might put more pressure on an already fragile environment. The balancing act of how to maintain sustainable food production without ruining the environment will be a challenge that REST should face up to before it is too late.


Impacts of the REST Programme

The commendable achievements of the programme have impacted differently along the gender divide. One of the characteristics of post war societies is that there are often more women than men because of the death rates of male fighters. Men are more mobile than women and are often forced to migrate in search of work opportunities or join the urban poor. In villages that are depleted of male labour, women attend to both domestic chores as well as agricultural and other activities. This point is well illustrated in the Tigray region, where in aggregate over 60% of those who participated in the food for recovery programme are women. REST and its international NGO partners have tried to ease women's workload by introducing flour mills instead of grinding stones, and a number of creches (kindergartens) around the Hagree El Salam area. These were operated in rotation by women beneficiaries.


In the age of market liberalization, REST and other NGOs must cope with external pressures related to the method of food procurement: Should economic efficiency be applied by purchasing large quantities of food, particularly grain, from large scale private companies or from small producers to stimulate the local economies and hence enhance post war recovery, rehabilitation and development? The view of REST and the Netherlands Organization for International Development Cooperation is that in agrarian based economies where agricultural production constitutes the people's mainstay, and where there are no significant sources of income outside the agricultural sector, grain market monopolies are a recipe for food insecurity. This is the case unless the donor community is prepared to continue indefinitely massive relief food shipments. In the Tigray region, the best chance for food recovery depends on REST's capacity to use relief food for the twin objectives of recovery and stimulating local markets and hence local food production.

Mutual interdependence has grown between REST and its Northern NGO partners. As REST empowers itself and becomes more independent, its partners find it difficult to "let go," particularly in a programme that displays joint success. This problem can be solved by creating new areas of cooperation in which REST diversifies and decentralizes further its activities.


Conclusion

REST's achievements can be consolidated, and the constraints it faces are surmountable and will not affect an otherwise unique post war rehabilitation programme. This programme was envisioned, formulated and implemented by one of East Africa's largest NGOs in cooperation with a number of Northern NGO partners. There are several implications of this experience for similar situations in Africa, and three issues should be noted: First, larger syntheses of people and continents are misleading and often portray images far removed from the specificity of struggles in which people are engaged and the achievements they are capable of attaining. Secondly, societies that have emerged from conflict situations have the greatest desire for the return of peace and for rebuilding their communities. The longing for peace is a genuine motivation for people to pick up the pieces and strive to do so much with too little. Finally, despite critiques of NGOs by state actors, people centred grassroots organizations with experience and optimal size can contribute positively to post war reconstruction in ways much closer to the people they are trying to assist than can the state and externally driven projects.


Notes

1. International Monetary Fund (1996). Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1996, Washington DC, IMF.

2. World Bank (1994). World Tables 1994, Baltimore and London, Johns Hopkins University.

3. Yachir, F. (1988). Mining in Africa Today: Strategies and Prospects, Tokyo, United Nations University and London, Zed Press.

4. Salih, M., M.A. Mohammed, and D. Eshete (1997). REST/NOVIB Integrated Food Security Programme: An Independent Evaluation Report, The Hague, Institute of Social Studies.

 
 
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