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THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY by Chris J. Bakwesegha
The dramatic and fundamental changes that began to take place in the world toward the end of the 1980s took many of us by surprise. Nonetheless, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the quest for a new democratic order to replace political and military dictatorships, as well as the command economy of the 1970s and 1980s in Africa, came as welcome events. Toward the end of the 1980s Africans, anxious to have change (sometimes for the sake of change) in country after country, began to demand that which had been denied them in years gone by. They wanted the right to identify their leaders through the ballot box, the right to participate in activities that directly affect their lives, the right to a free press, the right to a free market, the right to development, the right to say "No" to all forms and manifestations of oppression, as well as freedom of movement. It is all this that signaled the battle between the "old guards" and the "young Turks" over the destiny of Africa, which our continent is currently going through. Notwithstanding the above, by the beginning of the 1990s African leadership had read the writing on the wall and had understood the message. Africans were demanding freedom, justice, democracy and greater equality. African leadership understood that unless something was done immediately to respond to fundamental changes taking place in the world, the continent could easily lose its rightful place in the community of nations. Furthermore, African leaders admitted that you can hold at bay the invasion of an army; but you can never stop an idea whose time has come.
Therefore African heads of state and government, in the 26th ordinary session of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in July 1990, unanimously endorsed the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation. This charter was the culmination of the International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa, held in May 1990 in Arusha (Tanzania). The African heads of state and government, by endorsing the African Charter
for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, not only
recognized the central role of people's participation in activities that
directly affect their lives but clearly demonstrated that, unlike before,
the politics of inclusion, tolerance and openness were the hallmarks of
the new democratic order in Africa. But perhaps the most significant task that African leaders apportioned themselves, following the collapse of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, to enhance democracy and meet the expectations of their people through popular participation has been to hold democratic elections. These elections have been organized on a kind of popular basis and observed by international teams, not only for the sake of preventing fraud, but also to lend credence to the elections, build confidence among the voters, and somehow ensure that elections take place in a relatively free, fair and transparent atmosphere. Indeed, since the beginning of the 1990s issues of democracy and good governance have become such a major preoccupation for countries in Africa that the general perception now is one of a continent going through a "second liberation." Not only have ordinary people offered their chests as human shields against bullets in their physical confrontations with national armies, but they have also become so short sighted as to erroneously equate democracy with multiparty politics. The OAU, within the scope of its limited resources, has been able to observe elections of one type or another in over 45 of its 53 member states. Several of the 45 states have been able to hold their second round of general and/or presidential elections. Clearly, this has been the case with countries such as Zambia and Ghana. Even states that so far have not been able to hold elections have assiduously worked out programmes for transition to democracy through the ballot box.
Overall Africa seems to have done fairly well in bowing to the winds of democratic change since the 1980s. However, there are still a number of shortcomings related to Africa's electoral systems, which the author strongly feels need to be addressed; the following observations are largely based on the author's personal participation in some of Africa's electoral processes. Therefore donors should know that it is one thing to provide resources to assist a country to hold elections and it is another thing for them to make long term commitment through the provision of more resources, which will enable the local people themselves to build a democratic culture capable of containing friction and domestic tension. Furthermore in a situation where the local authority (or the state) has totally collapsed, the use of external agents such as international non governmental organizations may prove inevitable. But this should be a temporary affair and not a permanent feature, which may impede the promotion and utilization of local capacity to reconstruct a new society. Second, there are some leaders in Africa who still think that there is no life outside the State House. The urge to prolong their stay in power has caused these leaders to resort to all sorts of undemocratic means to manipulate the holding of elections. Ethnicity, for instance, has been one of the tools used to instill fear among the electorate so that they will succumb to the wishes of local politicians. The concept has been perceived by some leaders as the mother of all conflicts and wars in Africa. But we should ask two questions: To what extent has ethnicity been the root cause of the Somali conflict, when in fact the Somalis belong to one group of persons, divided only in terms of clans and sub clans? Why should we be witnessing bitter conflicts in countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, each characterized by only three ethnic groups, while countries such as Tanzania, inhabited by over 250 ethnic groups, have enjoyed relative peace since independence? It may be argued that ethnicity usually has been used by politicians as a means to an end in a society that is devoid of good governance, has failed to deliver goods to the common citizen, and where bread and butter issues have not been addressed with care and sincerity. Third, free and fair elections in some African countries have often been followed by "democracies" that do not deliver goods to the common citizen and that are far from winning confidence and satisfying the expectations of the electorate. As if this were not bad enough, the next round of elections in these same countries is usually manipulated by these same failed democracies. Constitutions are conveniently amended, or national electoral commissions are manipulated or replaced by incumbent governments that are poised to lose elections. All this is done in order for the failed democracy to remain in power. However, democracy that does not deliver goods to its citizens is a sham; combining non delivery of goods with corruption is simply devilish. And when a failed, sham and corrupt democracy applies brutality and naked manipulations to prolong its stay in power, it may finally become dictatorial-this is already happening in parts of Africa where governments have without shame refused to get voted out of power. It is because of this that some are suggesting the necessity to take "urgent steps to declare dictatorship as a crime against humanity." Just as it is important that elections are scrupulously observed, democracy as a process should also be observed over time against a code of conduct, in order to ensure the words used during the electoral campaign period that enabled a candidate to win a seat in parliament blossom into deeds during the years following elections. A fourth observation concerns the tendency for democracies in Africa to often start off very well, with most of the elements of a true democracy fulfilled: all the major parties are on board and there is room for freedom of expression and movement, equal access to the print and electronic media, popular participation in the voting procedures, a voters' registration that enjoys consensus of the people, free and fair elections, and so on. But after one or two years, breakdowns in democracy begin to take place. They may be in the form of strict control of the press and/or the press begins to be monopolized by the ruling party; security for the state and not for citizens; foreign elements, such as refugees, begin to be included in voter registration; there are efforts to amend the constitution in order to eliminate potential competitors; freedom of movement during the campaign period is severely curtailed; independence of the national electoral commission and the judiciary begins to diminish; and most importantly, popular participation in electoral processes diminishes, for example from 75% during the first round of elections, down to 15% 20% in the third round of national elections after perhaps 15 years. All these indicators, which are typical of a "democracy" that has failed to deliver, help to reduce the powers of a once popular and respectable "majority president" to an unpopular "minority president." This once popular president, who no longer enjoys the respect and confidence of the governed, will be confined to his palace, remain in his own cocoon and will eventually lose his grip over the electorate. Fifth, due to the fact that quite a number of governments in Africa have shown reluctance to level the political playing field, organized acts of intimidation and thuggery often make it difficult for opposition parties to compete on equal footing. In some countries, opposition parties have had to boycott elections. Examples of opposition parties withdrawing from the electoral race in
Africa abound. They include: In a rather different context, the causes of such withdrawal are more
fundamental than what remote observers would wish us to believe. Invariably,
opposition groups withdraw from an electoral race because of their perception
that the political playing field is not even or has not been leveled.
International observers, instead of apportioning blame to those opposition
groups, should show up on the scene early enough to be in a position to
observe the most important stages of the electoral process, namely: A point worth emphasizing is that fraudulent acts in an electoral process do not occur only on election day-most of them take place during voter registration and the political campaigning period. A sixth observation is that in most of the democratic elections held in Africa, their outcome has been challenged by those who have lost out, especially when the incumbent emerges as the victor. These challenges imply that however good an incumbent may be, he or she is not supposed to win the election! The election results in the Republic of the Congo and Gabon in 1993 provoked violence simply because the incumbent president won the elections. In Uganda in 1996, leaders of some of the opposition parties refused to accept the outcome of the elections where the incumbent president clearly emerged as the victor, even though the elections were declared free and fair by all the international observers. However, political maturity puts it that the art of winning is not something to be personalized. What really counts is not who wins the elections, but whether all the elements of democracy have been fulfilled during the electoral process. In other words, in a true democracy elections are not necessarily about those who win or lose but about the strict application of the rules of democracy. A seventh point to consider is the notion of natural ethnic majority versus political majority; this notion has tended to distort democracy in Africa. The best example of this ethnic/political duality can be seen in Burundi. Prior to the June 1993 elections there, the country was ruled for some time almost exclusively by the smaller Tutsi ethnic group. The outcome of the June 1993 elections, which were observed by the international community and declared "free" and "fair," introduced a fundamental shift in the political system of Burundi since the opposition majority Hutu won the elections. Following the elections, Burundi was described by some sectors of the international community as a country with the best model for democratic transition in Africa. Amazingly, three to four months later Burundi's "best" model for democracy in Africa was severely challenged by the citizens themselves. A Tutsi led military coup attempt resulted in the assassination of democratically elected President Milchor Ndadaye. This event halted the democratic transition, and since then peace in Burundi has remained elusive. Some think that the Westminster political model is still relevant to the African political condition; after all, why should a nation hold elections at all if those who win are not given a chance to monopolize power? However, others argue that a broad based type of political system, where those who lose are also to some extent embraced in the governance structure of the nation, is something Africa (in its present democratic transition) should aim at in order to ensure political stability. In other words the current trend in many African countries is for the winning party not to monopolize power as such but, while paying political debts to those who helped in the campaign process, to try and bring into the ruling party some members of the opposition party. However, those who are hand picked by the ruling party are not necessarily the "firebrand" or the ideologists or the political cream, but people who can easily go with the wind of the winning party. Sometimes the reason behind such a move is to directly weaken the power base of the opposition. But this is unfortunate because if the ruling party is not kept on its toes, the principle of good governance is automatically compromised. After all, losers in Africa tend to end up by losing out every time fresh elections are held in the country concerned; that is why instability, especially through the instrumentality of coups d'état and counter coups has remained a characteristic feature of the African continent. But while the politics of "winner take all" and "loser lose all" may not be the best in countries characterized by so many ethnic groups, broad based political systems can only be useful in a country just emerging from a war situation. And even then, this type of political arrangement should only be temporary while the issue of constitutionality is addressed in a comprehensive way. Emphatically, what will save Africa in the final analysis is neither Westminster nor broad based politics but a constitution that derives its authority from the people themselves or their certified representatives, and not from outside. Eight, in the July 1990 Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the Political and Socio Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, African heads of state and government stated that: "We...recommit ourselves to the further democratization of our societies and to the consolidation of democratic institutions in our countries. We reaffirm the right of our countries to determine, in all sovereignty, their system of democracy on the basis of their socio cultural values, taking into account the realities of each of our countries and the necessity to ensure development and satisfy the basic needs of our peoples. We therefore assert that democracy and development should go together and should be mutually reinforcing." (emphasis added) A ninth observation concerns the fact that elections are a very costly exercise, so international observers including the OAU tend to arrive on the scene of elections too late and then leave too early. As Ibrahim Fall has stated, "Free and fair elections are chiefly a reflection of the involvement of the people." It goes without saying that the way people get involved in their electoral processes matters greatly. Therefore, in order for the international observers to be able to declare elections as "free" and "fair" or otherwise, they must observe the mood of the people concerned, not only on election day but also well before the elections. In this way they can identify forces that might conspire to bog down the electoral process or frustrate the democratic transition. The lack of fairness of an election and the lack of freedom for people to participate in the electoral process are not only occasioned by events that take place on election day, but also by events that happen just before registration, during the registration period, during the campaign period, between the end of the campaign period and the election day, and of course the election day itself. Furthermore, since elections are the launching pad of a long term democratic process, in the course of which institutions for sustaining that democracy must be built, it is equally important that the period just after the holding of elections is closely monitored in order to discover obstacles to the consolidation of the democratic transition just set in motion. The tenth and final point concerns the issue of finance and logistics. Election observation missions have remained a serious concern for the OAU as far as Africa's electoral processes are concerned. We have already mentioned that due to lack of funds, OAU election observation missions have been arriving on the scene too late. And as if this were not bad enough, the same missions, which have had and still have a lack of funds, must leave the electoral scene too early. OAU election observation missions, mainly due to financial constraints, have remained relatively small in size and merely symbolic. Therefore, they are spread out far too thinly in the country where elections are taking place. Sometimes OAU observers have had to be confined to the national capital, or to the national capital as well as a few other provincial capitals. Because of lack of logistics, OAU election observers have also been forced to rely on other international observers for logistical support, especially in terms of transport and communication. Indeed, this was the case in the 1992 Ethiopian district and regional elections. In conclusion, democracy in all its variations is preferable, of course,
to any other form of governance by coercion-African or non African. Nonetheless
democracy is, and should be, a graduated process. Following local elections,
the process should develop and mature with time until it becomes part
and parcel of a people's culture, all the time recognizing the basic features
and circumstances of a particular society. Democracy that is forced or
imposed on a people may, and indeed can, be rejected like any other form
of government for the simple reason that it is a far cry from being home
grown. In other words, democratic institutions need time to evolve and
must derive both in spirit and in reality from the people-all the people.
Experience with election observers in Africa has revealed that the Africans of today are anxious to learn something about Western democracy. This is clearly evident almost everywhere in Africa. Yet, Africans do not want a Western or indigenous model simply imposed on them or linked to certain conditionalities. It must be recognized that Africa's recent elections are just the beginning of a long search for a durable system of governance that will preserve Africa's sovereignty, defend territorial integrity, consolidate peace, security and stability on the continent, and recognize the aspirations and unique history, socio cultural values and economic background of all her peoples. Political tolerance, compromise and above all statesmanship and a high sense of understanding should be expected of all African people, especially those placed in high office and positions of trust, throughout the period of democratic transition. While Africa strives to achieve all those goals, the encouragement and support of the OAU and the international community through the United Nations, not least of all, would make a difference in terms of continued understanding of African issues, counseling, guidance and dialogue. For this reason the following recommendations are made. -- Since democracy in all its forms and manifestations means inclusion and not exclusion, governments and opposition parties in Africa should do all in their power to turn to the negotiating table. Indeed, with her harsh and fragile socio economic environment, the African continent cannot afford more civil wars than those already taking place today. -- The OAU General Secretariat should continue engaging governments and opposition groups in Africa, within the spirit of paragraph 22 of the 1993 Cairo declaration.1 It authorizes the Secretariat to hold consultations with the parties involved in a conflict for purposes of resolving their differences peacefully and through dialogue. Emphasis should be placed on the fact that the political competitors do not necessarily have to like each other; but that for the good of Africa, they have and must tolerate each other and even acknowledge that each has a legitimate role to play in the politics of the country. -- The OAU should be enabled to get closer to the people, and observing elections in a comprehensive rather than a symbolic manner should be one of the ways to achieve that objective. Currently, much of civil society does not know about the OAU. The OAU Secretary General, however, has not failed to recognize all the problems that his organization has faced in its noble exercise of observing elections since 1990. Indeed in his report to the 58th ordinary session of the Council of Ministers in 1993, the Secretary General recognized the need "to continually examine ways and means of augmenting our election observation capacity within the OAU Member States so that we can be of greater service to the Member States."
1. Organization of African Unity (1993). Declaration of the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government on the Establishment within the OAU of
a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, OAU, Cairo. |
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